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The Ordinance of William the Conqueror (1072)Its Implications in the Modern
Law of Succession
By

I.

ALISON RPPY*

INTRODUCTION

SoA years ago, in bringing to a close a short sketch on the
Historical and Statutory Background of Wills,1 attention was
directed to the ancient common-law rule that where a will devising real estate and bequeathing personal property was admitted to probate, the decree was only prima facie evidence as to
the title to the realty, although conclusive as to personalty. Investigation revealed that this rule of law2 had been in full force
* Dean and Professor of Law, New York Law School.

'RPPY AND ToMPKiNs, THE HIsTOicAL AND STATUTORY BACKGROUND OF THE

LAw OF WILLS (Chicago, 1928).
'United States: Campbell v. Porter, 162 U.S. 478, 40 L. Ed. 1044, 16 S. Ct.
871 (1896); Harrison v. Rowan, 3 Wash. C.C. 580, Fed. Case No. 6141 (1820).
Massachusetts: Parker v. Parker, 65 Mass. (11 Cush.) 519 (1853).
New Jersey: Den v. Ayers, 13 N.J.L. 153 (1832).
Pennsylvania: Smith v. Bonsall, 5 Rawle (Pa.) 80 (1835); Rowland v. Evans,
6 Pa. 435 (1847).
South Carolina: Brown v. Gibson, 10 S. Car. L. (1 Nott & McC.) 326
(1818); Crosland v. Murdock, 15 S. Car. L. (4 McCord) 217 (1827).
Virginia: Ballow v. Hudson, 54 Va. (13 Gratt.) 672 (1857).
See also, Warren, Problems in Probate and Administration, 32 Htav. L. REv.
315 (1919).
A decree of probate admitting a will of real and personal property to probate
is conclusive evidence as to title to personalty, but only prima facie evidence as
to title to real estate.
English: King v. Inhabitants of Netherseal, 4 T. R. 258, 100 Eng. Rep. 1006
(1791); Duchess of Kingston, 11 Harg, St. Tr. 261. 20 How. St. Tr. 355 (1776);
Marriott v. Marriott, 1 Str. 666, 93 Eng. Rep. 770 (1726); Habergham v. Vincent,
2 Ves. Jr. 223, 30 Eng. Rep. 595 (1792).
United States: Tompkins v. Tompkins, 1 Story 547, Fed. Cas. No. 14091, 24
Fed. Cas. 401 (1841).
Alabama: Knox v. Paull, 95 Ala. 505, 11 So. 156 (1892).
Delaware: Cummins v. Cummins, I Marv. (Del). 423, 31 Atl. 816 (1895).
Illinois: Luther v. Luther, 122 Il. 558, 13 N.E. 166 (1887); Barnett v. Barnett, 284 IM.580, 120 N.E. 532 (1918).
Iowa: Kostelecky v. Scherhart, 99 Iowa 120, 68 N.W. 591 (1896).
Kansas: Meyers v. Smith, 50 Kan. 1, 31 Pac. 670 (1892).
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and effect at an early date in several states and in New York as
late as the year 1910.' This raised interesting questions as to the
origin of the rule, how it came to be the law in New York, why
the doctrine was changed in 1910, and whether there was any
connection between this development and the adoption by New
York in 1930 of its new Statute of Devolution, 4 which, for purposes of descent and distribution, abolished the distinctions between real and personal property. The answer to these queries
can only be discovered by resort to the historical background of
the law of succession, which had its foundations in principles of
English feudal policy."
II. THE BACKGROUND AND ORIGIN OF
THE ORDINANCE
Prior to the Norman Conquest, Norman law had developed
an ecclesiastical jurisprudence as a result of long conflicts between the church and the state, which conflicts had been settled
by compacts under which each organization, by way of compromise, was assigned a given sphere of operation. But the
church, long accustomed to undivided jurisdiction, stood ever
ready to press its claim of supremacy.6 In this situation, William
Kentucky: Allen v. Froman, 96 Ky. 313, 28 S.W. 497 (1894).
Massachusetts: Cooper v. Monroe, 237 Mass. 192, 129 N.E. 436 (1921);
Mitchell v. Weaver, 242 Mass. 331, 136 N.E. 166 (1922).
Minnesota: Babcock v. Collins, 60 Minn. 73, 61 N.W. 1020 (1895).
Mississippi: Virginia Trust Co. v. Buford, 123 Miss. 572, 86 So. 356 (1920),
(suggestion of error denied, Virginia Trust Co. v. Buford, 123 Miss. 572, 86 So.
516 (1920)).
Missouri: Graham v. Graham, 297 Mo. 290, 249 S.W. 37 (1928).
North Carolina: Osborne v. Leake, 89 N.C. 433 (1883).
Ohio: Swasey v. Blackman, 8 Ohio 5 (1837); Woodbridge v. Banning, 14
O.S. 328 (1863).
Pennsylvania: Wilson v. Gaston, 92 Pa. 207 (1879); Wall v. Wall, 123 Pa.
545, 16 Ati. 598 (1889).
Tennessee: Wright v. Smithson, 75 Tenn. (7 Lea) 12 (1896).
Vermont: Domestic Missionary Society v. Eells, 68 Vt. 497, 35 Atl. 463
(1896).
Wisconsin: O'Dell v. Rogers, 44 Wis. 136 (1878).
'In re Goldsticker's Will, 192 N.Y. 35, 84 N.E. 581 (1908). But the rule was
changed by statute two years later. N.Y. Laws 1910, c. 578, p. 1416. See, also,
N.Y. 4Laws 1914, c. 443, § 2250, p. 1775.
N.Y. Laws 1939, amending N.Y. Laws 1909, Real Property Law, Art. III.
'REavus, TREA-TSE ON TaE LAW or DscENTs m Ta SEvE AL STATyS, Preface, i, ii, (New York, 1825).
'1 POLLOCK AND MArrLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, Bk. I, c. II, 52
(Cambridge, 1895).
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the Conqueror, in his relations with the church in Normandy,
was careful to keep the affairs of the church and state separate.
Nevertheless, being of a religious turn, he sought reform within
the church, insisting upon a strict observance of monastic life, the
improvement of the knowledge and morals of the secular clergy,
and the development of a system of ecclesiastical law. He was
determined, as a matter of policy, that in his dominions the church
should remain subordinate to the state. In short, it may be said
that, in a broad sense, William was pledged to maintain these
religious concepts wherever his influence became dominant.7 And
it was, therefore, inevitable that the conquest should bring England into the middle of a dormant controversy. If the Conqueror
was to avoid difficulties, he "would have to define in precise terms
his relation to the spiritual power in his new Kingdom, and his
definition would, if this were possible, be the definition which
had come down to him from Norman dukes and Frankish Kings.
On the one hand he would have to concede an ample room to
'the canons and episcopal law,' on the other hand, he would insist that the spiritual power should assume no right in England
that it had not exercised in Normandy." s In Normandy, William's
right hand adviser was Lanfranc, a lawyer who was versed in
Lombard, Roman and Canon law. When, therefore, the time
came for subduing England and establishing what he regarded
as the true relationship between church and state, the man of
arms had behind him not only a great theologian but also a great
lawyer, to aid in the institution of a policy which was to be implemented within six years after the battle of Hastings.
After the conquest, tremendous social, economic, political and
religious changes took place in England. These changes were not
to be imposed by a foreign code, for William was not desirous of
importing Norman law as a body. Nor were these two streams of
law meeting to form a single river. In whatever mixture of law
was to ensue, English law had the advantage, as a great portion
IEADimtr, HisromiA Novoarmf, p. 9.
'1 Po~r.ocx AND MATLAND, HIToRY OF ENGLISH LAw, Bk. I, c. II, 52 (Cambridge, 1895).
at 54. But compare the statement of Plucknett, who observes: "In the
twelfth century... it is impossible to distinguish the lawyer from the statesman
and the politician; men such as Glanvill and Beckett, Lanfranc and Herbert Walter,
must have had considerable influence upon legal development, but still we can

'Id.

hardly describe them as lawyers."

A CoNcisE HIsToRY OF THm ComoN LAW,

Pt. II, c. 13, 222 (4th ed. London, 1948).
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of it was in writing.10 The changes which occurred, therefore,
were brought about within the frame-work of a centralized crown,
aided and supported by the introduction into England of Norman
feudalism, under which estates in land were to be held through
tenure, and by Norman state-church relationships, under which
the church was to occupy a subordinate position. Thus, when
William came to consider the problem of reorganizing the existing
agencies of law and justice, he found the bishop and the earl
presiding over the assembly of thegns, free men and priests which
constituted the shire court." The local courts of the shire and
hundred exercised jurisdiction over subject matter which, in
Normandy, would have been regarded as properly within the
province of an ecclesiastical court. It is not surprising, therefore,
to find William, in accordance with his life-long policy in Normandy, and doubtless with the advice and encouragement of
Lanfranc, taking steps to separate the ecclesiastical and commonlaw courts. This end was accomplished in 1072 by what is now
referred to as the Ordinance of William the Conqueror.' It provided that the church men should no longer carry on ecclesiastical
business in the Hundred and County Courts, but should thereafter transact their affairs in their own special courts presided
0 I POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, Bk. I, c. III, 57
(Cambridge, 1895).
"'One certain and very well-known peculiarity of the Anglo-Saxon period is
that secular and ecclesiastical courts were not separated and the two jurisdictions
were hardly distinguished. The bishop sat in the county court; the church claimed
for him a large share in the direction of even secular justice, and the claim was fully
allowed by princes who could not be charged with weakness. Probably the bishop
was the only member of the court who possessed any learning or any systematic
training in public affairs." 1 POLLOCK AND MArrILAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH L,%.w,
Bk. I, c. I, 17 (Cambridge, 1895).
' The Ordinance of William the Conqueror reads as follows:
"No Bishop or Archdeacon, do henceforth hold pleas in the Hundred concerning episcopal laws, nor bring any cause which belongs to the government of
souls to the judgment of secular men, but that whosoever according to the Episcopal Laws, shall for what cause or fault soever be summoned, shall come to a place
which the Bishop shall choose and name for this purpose, and there make answer
concerning his cause, and do right to God and his Bishop, not according to the
Hundred, but according to the Canons and Episcopal Laws."
Taken from Introductory Note, XI, 1 Bradf. Sur. Rep. ,ax(1872).
This date, of the Ordinance of William the Conqueror, formerly regarded as
uncertain, has now been assigned to this document in a note by Walker, The Date
of the Conqueror's Ordinance Separating the Ecclesiastical and Lay Courts, 39
ENGLISH HisT. REv. 400 (1924). Cf. Lichtenstein, The Date of Separation of
Ecclesiastical and Lay Jurisdictionin England, 3 ILL. L. REv. 347 (1909).
For an early discussion of the separation of the spiritual and lay courts, see 1
Reeves, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LA-v, c. II, 283-289 (Finlason's Am. ed., Philadelphia, 1880).
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over by members of the clergy, the idea being to develop both an
eccesliastical procedural and substantive body of canon law.13
III. GENERAL SUGGESTIONS AS TO POSSIBLE
IMPLICATIONS OF THE SEPARATION OF
THE ECCLESIASTICAL AND COMMON
LAW COURTS
This early separation of the common law and ecclesiastical
courts 14 was bound to have tremendous effect upon the future
development of English law. For one thing it made certain the
full-fledged growth of the canon law system, which, when fully
developed on its substantive and procedural sides, was to compete with law and equity for jurisdiction in many fields.' 5 The
origin and development of that great procedural device-the writ
of prohibition-was one of the by-products of the conflict which
was waged for years between the common law and ecclesiastical
courts, it being the principal instrument by which the common
law courts first resisted spiritual invasions in some fields of jurisdiction and later completely barred them in others." It seems
not unlikely that the separation may have influenced the language
of early English pleading, in the sense that it gave those who
presided over the ecclesiastical courts and who were trained in
Latin and Norman French, a more dignified status than they
'I Por.Locx AND MArrLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, Bk. I, c. III, 67
(Cambridge, 1895). See, also, article by Setaro, A Prologue to a History of the
English EcclesiasticalLaw, 6 B.U.L. REv. 358 (1936).
t tEP.PY AND Topriu Ns, Tim HIsTORIcAL AND STATUTORY BACKGROUND OF
Tm LAw oF WmLs, Ch.HI, 96-181 (Chicago, 1928).
'Id. at 145-150.
"'In an article by Wolfram, The "Ancient and just" Writ of Prohibition in
New York, 52 COL. L. REv. 334 (1952), in referring to this very matter, the
author states:
"William the Conqueror separated the ecclesiastical from the temporal courts
of England and touched off four centuries of incessant conflict over their respective jurisdictions. The Law courts employed new weapons, the clergy resorted to
the old. Writs of prohibition, upholding the prerogative of the throne, issued out
of the king's court to check the steadily increasing influence of the church; in retaliation, excommunications thundered out against lay judges, and both oaths and
contracts, abjuring the right to apply to the civil authorities, were extracted from
individual litigants by the clergy. The late thirteenth century saw the growth of
a strong national spirit expressed in greater loyalty to the king, and the temporal
judges, encouraged to defy excommunications and to disregard ecclesiastical oaths
and contracts, for the first time succeeded in confining the courts Christian 'within
their just and proper limits.' The church's angry protests against the writs, directed
to Parliament in 1316, resulted only in the statute De Articulis Cleri which narrowed the jurisdiction of the Catholic courts to causes testamentary and matrimonial."
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might otherwise have enjoyed and a greater voice in determining
1
the nature and content of the pleadings and the records. It
presaged and perhaps was a factor in Bracton's classification of
the common-law actions as real, personal and mixed, as the separation of the lay from the spiritual courts accentuated the tendency of property to fall into the two classifications of real and
personal property, which distinction lay at the bottom of the
classification of actions;' 8 it was largely responsible for the socalled fundamental distinctions between real and personal property, which for many years have been the subject of first-year
instruction in our schools of law;19 it was related to, if indeed, it
did not encourage, the development of that much misunderstood
doctrine-actiopersonalis moritur cum persona-thatthe death of
either party to a personal duty takes away all remedy and destroys
the duty. Such a doctrine, if strictly applied, would have prevented the ecclesiastical court, through its representative-the
executor or administrator-from protecting the dead man's estate. o If this be true, as the principle that a right of action could
not be assigned at common law was related to the maxim actio
personalismoritur cum persona-the division of the common law
and ecclesiastical jurisdictions was not unrelated to the assignability of rights of actions.2 ' In this field of venue of actions it
probably influenced the development of the distinction between
local and transitory actions to the extent that it emphasized the

I1 POLLO( AND MAITLAND, HISTOnY OF ENGLISH LAw, Bk. I,c.M, 58-66
(Cambridge, 1895). It has been said in this connection that "The Bishops took
pains to learn the tongue of the common people.... Lichtenstein, The Date of
the Separation of Ecclesiastical and Lay Jurisdictions in England, 3 ILL. L. REv.
347, 349 (1909).
S83
STRET,FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LABmnrry, c.IV, Classification of Actions
in the Common Law System, 37-41 (Northport, 1906).
"Lord Holdsworth, in referring to this very matter, but without discussing it
in detail, observed:
"This abandonment of jurisdiction to the ecclesiastical courts has tended,
more than any other single cause, to accentuate the difference between real and
personal property; for even when the ecclesiastical courts had ceased to exercise
some parts of this jurisdiction, the law which they had created was exercised by
their successors." 1 HoLswOarT, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, c. VII, 625 (4th
ed., Boston, 1931).
' 3 STRnEET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LiABnrr, c. VI,Actio Personalis cum
Persona, 62 (Northport, 1906):
"The development of a satisfactory theory of succession and representation in
the estate of deceased persons undoubtedly contributed much to impeach the
broad doctrine that a personal right of action perishes with the death of either
party."
33 SREET,FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LrInrrrY, c.VII, Assignment of Right
of Action, 76-89 (Northport, 1906).
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artificial distinction between real and personal property.2 2 And,
finally, as we shall see, it exercised a profound and disturbing effect upon the law of succession.23
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE ORDINANCE UPON THE LAW
OF TESTATE AND INTESTATE SUCCESSION
It was in this latter connection that the separation of the
ecclesiastical jurisdiction from that of the common-law courts
had its most profound effect, exerting an influence upon the
future procedural and substantive development of real and personal property in both England and America, insofar as they
were affected by testaments of personalty and devises of realty,
and insofar as they were affected by descent of real property or
the distribution of personal property.2
At this time, or shortly thereafter, the spiritual courts acquired
jurisdiction over the probate of testaments, and in time, as a consequence thereof, control over the distribution of the decedents
personalty. Perhaps this development arose out of the church's
claim of the dead man's last will which was connected with his
last confession.2 5 This claim extended to an assertion of jurisdiction to pronounce on the validity of wills, to their interpretation,
as well as the regulation of "her creature the testamentary executor, whom she succeeded in placing alongside of the English
heir."261 From jurisdiction over the probate of testaments of personalty, it was only a step to claim jurisdiction over the succession
of moveables, although the process by which this occurred remains obscure. It may have been the result of the belief that to
die intestate was sinful, but in any event perhaps as a result of
" 3 STRr, FOuNDATIONS OF LEGAL LiABrry,c. VIII, The Venue of Actions,
90-95 (Nortbport, 1906).
' The jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery over the administration of the
assets of decedents estates was also a development which had its origin in the
separation of the ecclesiastical and common-law courts under the Ordinance of
William the Conqueror in 1072, as it created another system of courts which
was to contest with the common law and ecclesiastical courts for jurisdiction over
the dead man's property. lEpPY AND Tomnpmrs, HsromcAL AND STATUTORY
BACKGROUND OF TRm LAW OF Wr.Ls, c. I1, 145-159 (Chicago, 1928).
REPPY AND Tompars, HisToruc,. AND STATUTORY BACKGROUND OF TBE
LAW OF WiLLs, c. I, 101-102 (Chicago, 1928).
' PLUCKNEiT, A CONCISE HisTonY or THE CommfoN LAW, Pt. VI, c. II, 689

(4th ed., London, 1948).

1

POLLOCK

AND MALAND,

(Cambridge, 1895).

IsTroY OF ENGLISH

LAW,

Bk. I,

c. IV, 107
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this development the law regulating the distribution of personalty,
both on its substantive and procedural side, began flowing down
a separate and distinct channel from that of the law of realty;
that is, what constituted the proper execution of a testament, as
well as its probate, and how personalty should be distributed in
case of intestacy, became entirely a problem of the canon law.
At the same time the common-law courts retained jurisdiction
over freehold estates and, as an incident thereof, jurisdiction over
devises of freehold estates. From this point, it is also clear that
they exercised control over the descent of real property. Thereafter, the law of real property, insofar as it became the subjectmatter of devises, on both the substantive and procedural law
sides, began flowing down a separate and distinct channel from
that of the law of personalty; that is, what constituted the proper
execution of a will, as well as its probate, and how realty should
descend in case of intestacy, became entirely a problem of the
common law.
As a matter of actual practice, how was this worked out? The
general rule of law is that the judgment of a court having exclusive jurisdiction over the subject-matter and the parties to an
action is conclusive upon the same matter between the same
parties when they appear incidentally in question in another
court for a different purpose.27 If the rule were otherwise there
might be conflicting decisions upon the same subject-matter between the same parties, and thus the adjudication be subjected to
interminable doubts, with the general rules of law as to the effect
of a plea of res judicata completely overthrown. Such a decision
was treated at common law as being in the nature of a proceeding
in rem, necessarily conclusive upon the matter in controversy, and
hence making for the safety and repose of society.
In this connection it should be kept in mind that under the
ecclesiastical and later English law two kinds of probate were
developed for the proof of testaments: probate in the common
form, and probate in the solemn form.
In probate in the common form, an ex parte proceeding without notice to the next of kin, was obtained on production of the
will, accompanied by the oath of the executor that he believed
it to be the last testament of the deceased testator. If the instru2,Duchess of Kingston, 11 Harg. St. Tr. 261, 20 How. St. Tr. 855 (1776).
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ment was regular in form, this was sufficient, but if some irregularity developed, then the executor had to prove its due
execution by affidavits. In either case, the judge then annexed
his probate and seal to the testament, thus confirming the same.28
After the Wills Act of 1837,29 the allowance of probate in common form was upon affidavit of one or more witnesses to the will,
making out its execution in conformity with the requirements of
the Act.
Probate in solemn form is a proceeding upon notice to all the
parties interested, with an opportunity to attend and be heard on
the question of probate.3 0 The judgment rendered in this form
was conclusive evidence as to the validity of the testament and
as to the title to the personalty thereby bequeathed.
Swinburn, in comparing the two forms of probate, says that
in the common or vulgar form, those interested are not cited to be
present; whereas, in the solemn form, they are cited, with the
result that the executor, who proved the will in the common form
in the absence of those legally interested, may be compelled to
prove it again in solemn form. If, in the meantime the witnesses
have died, the validity of the entire testament may be put in
question; particularly if ten years have not elapsed to raise a
presumption as to the observation of all solemnities in the probate. On the contrary, if the testament had been probated in
solemn form, the executor could not be compelled to prove it
again, and its validity could not be questioned, even though all
the witnesses were dead.'
This was the situation when the Wills Act of 154032 gave the
right to devise land, thus raising the issue as to how a will should
be probated. The common law and ecclesiastical courts having
been permanently separated under the Ordinance of William the
Conqueror (1072), the ecclesiastical courts, in theory, could not
probate a will devising land, as they had no jurisdiction over succession to freehold estates. Indeed, the common-law courts frequently resorted to the writ of prohibition in order to prevent the
' REPPY AN To.-P.%xis, Hs-oucAL ANDwSTATUTORY BACKGROUND OF THE
LAw OF WuLrs, c. IMI, 112 (Chicago, 1928).
' 7 Wm. IV & 1 Viet. c. 26.
For the procedural steps in the solemn form of probate, see REPPY AND

Toin'ns,

HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY BACKGROUND OF THE LAw OF WILLS, C.

III, 112-113 (Chicago, 1928).
Id. at 113.
32 Hen. VIII. c. 1.
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ecclesiastical courts from hearing suits involving a devise of real
estate.
This division of jurisdiction had to be met and it was met
and solved, but only in a way which was to provoke endless controversy between the lay and spiritual courts. Let us suppose,
after the separation of the common-law and ecclesiastical courts,
that a testator executed a will in which he mingled the disposition of both real and personal property, and then died. As the
will included personal property, it naturally had to be submitted
to the ecclesiastical court for probate, as that court had jurisdiction over testaments. If a decree issued admitting the instrument
to probate, a question arose as to what was its effect as to the
title to the realty and personalty devised and bequeathed thereunder.
First, let us consider the effect of the probate of the instrument as to the personalty. In England it was held that the probate of a will, mingling the disposition of both real and personal
property, was conclusive evidence as to validity of the instrument
as a testament and as to the title to the personalty included
therein, in the sense that the same question could not be reexamined or re-litigated in any other tribunal. The reason for this
was that the decree of probate, being the judgment of a court of
competent jurisdiction, having control over the subject-matter in
controversy, and all parties, who had any interest for the purpose
of contesting the validity of the instrument as a mode of transferring title to personalty, was conclusive between the parties involved. In short such decree was in the nature of a judgment in
rem, so that if one of the parties in another action or suit, subsequently raised a question as to the title to the personal property,
the decree of the ecclesiastical court could be pleaded in bar
under the doctrine of res judicata, thus avoiding conflicting
adjudications upon the same subject-matter between the same
parties.
Second, the effect of the decree of the ecclesiastical court
upon the validity of the will and the title to the realty devised
thereunder may be seen in its proper perspective. The rule in
England was that the decree of the ecclesiastical court admitting
to probate an instrument disposing of both real and personal
property, was not even evidence as to the title to the real estate.

ORDiNANcE OF Wmnvi THE CONQUEROR

The reason was that the ecclesiastical courts, by reason of the
Ordinance of 1072, had no jurisdiction over freehold estates or
over wills devising freehold estates, hence the probate of a will
purporting to dispose of both kinds of property, was wholly inoperative and void, except as to the personal estate of the decedent. The validity of wills of real estate was solely cognizable
by courts of common law in the ordinary forms of suit. Thus,
title to the real estate included in the will could be disputed in a
subsequent action of ejectment, which was the customary method
of testing the validity of a will passing title to real property. It
thus appears that the general rule stated at the beginning of this
section that the judgment of a court having exclusive jurisdiction
over the subject-matter and the parties to an action is conclusive
and hence a bar to any subsequent relitigation of the same parties
and involving the same subject-matter, had no application to the
decree of probate involving a will of real estate, for the reason
that the court had no jurisdiction over freehold estates and hence
no jurisdiction over devises thereof.
V. THE SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL LAW OF
REALTY FLOWS DOWN A SEPARATE AND
DISTINCT CHANNEL
A. As to Wills.- The absurdity of having a will involving the
disposition of both real and personal property passed upon by
different courts was pointed out by Lord Hardwicke, Chancellor,
in the case of Montgomery v. Clarke.33 He declared: "I have often
thought it a very great absurdity, that a will which consists both
of real and personal estate, notwithstanding it has been set aside
at law for the insanity of the testator, shall still be litigated upon
paper depositions only in the ecclesiastical court, because they
have jurisdiction on account of the personal estate disposed of
by it. I wish gentlemen of abilities would take this inconvenience
and absurdity into their consideration, and find out a proper
remedy by the assistance of the legislature. But as the law stands
at present, it is not in the power of this court to interpose, so as
to stop the proceedings in the ecclesiastical court." In view of
'2 Atk. 379, 26 Eng. Rep. 629 (1742).
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the absurd situation referred to, it may be well to trace the steps
by which the law came to such a state.
1. On the Substantive Law Side.-After the separation of the
common law and ecclesiastical courts, the law of wills went
through a series of developments on its substantive side. Firstthe
right to make a will was abolished on the theory that a conveyance
of real estate by will violated the common law rule requiring an
open, notorious livery of seisin 4 This decision was avoided by
resort to the use, under which a testator, in contemplation of
death, would convey his real property to one or more trustees,
with instructions as to how it should be held and distributed. As
the trustee acquired the legal title and the seisin, upon the
death of the testator there was no transfer of the legal seisin,
hence no violation of the common law rule 5 against a conveyance
of real estate without open notorious livery of seisin. But this
practice received a death blow with the enactment of the Statute
of Uses36 abolishing such use of the use. As a result, between
1535, the date of the statute and 1540, the date of the First Wills
Act, 37 wills were entirely abolished in England, except as pre-

served by being executed under some local custom as, for example, the custom of gavelkind in London.
In 1540, however, the right to execute wills of real estate was
restored, with the only formality in execution required being that
the instrument must be in writing. Between 1540 and 1676 it
was frequently observed that the revocation of a will should require as much solemnity as did the execution of a will, but still no
action was taken. This was changed in 1675 as a result of the
case of Cole v. Mordaunt3 An aged testator married a young
woman, made a will, leaving a portion of his estate to her, with
the remainder to charities, and then died. After his death the
wife proved a revocation of the gifts to the charities by use of
perjured testimony which, upon discovery, caused Lord Notting2 PoI~oc

MArrLAND, HISToRY oF ENGLiSH LAW, Bk. I, c. VI, § 8,
RFAPy Am Tompxis, HIsToRcAL AND STATuToRY BAcKGRouND oF Tam LAW OF WILLS, c. I, 12 (Chicago, 1928).
' See REPPY AND TomniaNs, HIsToRaCAL AND STATUTORY BACKGROUND OF
THE LAW oF WILLS, C. I, 18-14 (Chicago, 1928).
AN

326-827 (Cambridge, 1895); See,

"27 Hen. VIII, c. 10 1585).
27 Hen. VIII, c. 10 1585).
'Stated in note to Mathews v. Warner, 4 Ves. Jr. 186, 81 Eng. Rep. 96
(1798).
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ham to observe that he hoped to live to see the day when it would
require as much formality to revoke as to execute a will. The
following year, 1676, saw the enactment of the Statute of
Frauds, 9 under which such requirement as to revocation came
into operation. But more imporant, for our purposes, is the fact
that the statute added to the formality of writing required for the
execution of wills in the Wills Act of 1540, the additional requirements that the will should be signed by the testator, and attested
by three or four credible witnesses in the testator's presence. Two
questions arose under this statute, one, whether a signature of a
testator, made out of the presence of the witnesses, could be cured
by the later acknowledgement of his signature by the testator in
the presence of the witnesses; two, whether a will not signed at

the foot or end thereof was valid.
As to the first question, it was held that the failure of a testator
to sign the will in the presence of the witnesses could be cured by
an acknowledgement of his signature in their presence, a construction favorable to the common-law doctrine of freedom of

alienation; as to the second, it was held in Le Mayne v. Stanley,40
that even a signature in the commencement of the will satisfied
the statutory requirement.
Thus, the substantive law requirements for the execution of a
will, included a writing, a signature by the testator, and attestation by three or four credible witnesses in the presence of the
testator, were widely divergent from those for testaments, there
being no requirement as to formality in execution as to the latter.
And this disparity between what constituted a will of realty and
a testament of personalty, having begun in 1072, was still in effect
in 1676, and was to continue until 1837, which covered over all
a period of almost eight hundred years.
2. On the Procedural Law Side.-The law of wills on the
procedural or probate side, also flowed down a separate channel

from the law of testaments, after the Ordinance of 1072. If the
decree of the ecclesiastical court was only prima facie evidence
of such title, or no evidence at all, how was a will which disposed
' 29 Car. II, c. 3. On the origin and date of the statute, see article by
Costigan, The Date and Authority of the Statute of Frauds, 26 H.nv. L. REv. 329
(1918).
'" 3 Lev. 1, 83 Eng. Rep. 545 (1681).
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of real as well as personal property to be probated, or how was
the title of a devisee thereunder to be made conclusive? The problem may be made clear by an hypothetical case. Suppose T dies
leaving a will in which he devises Blackacre to B, and bequeaths
his personalty to C. After the ecclesiastical court admitted the
instrument to probate, B, in reliance thereon, attempts to take
possession of Blackaere, but finds H, the heir of T, in possession.
Holding that B's decree of probate is no evidence, or at most,
only prima facie evidence of title to real estate, as the ecclesiastical court had no jurisdiction over freehold estates, H refused to
surrender possession to B. Accordingly, B was forced to institute
an action of ejectment against the heir in which he alleged, anong
other allegations, title under the will. H's denial brought title in
issue and then at the trial B offered the will of T as evidence of
his title. As title depended upon the validity of the will, B was
required to prove its due execution in the same manner as a deed,
due allowance being made for the difference in the nature of the
two instruments and the formalities of execution. If the court
accepted B's proof, judgment was entered for B, execution on the
judgment issued, and B now took possession of Blackaere under
a judgment which was conclusive of the devisee's title. By this
process a will of real estate was probated at common law,41 and
this story explains why so many of the cases which a student
studies in the casebooks on real property came up on an ejectment
under a will. Both the lawyers and the litigants were probating
the will, but both were equally unconscious that the necessity
for the mode of procedure invoked therein was in any way connected with William's famous Ordinance.
B. As to Descent.-After the Ordinance under which the
common-law courts retained jurisdiction over the procedural and
substantive law of wills, it was inevitable that they should also
continue to control the descent of freehold estates. It is probable
that descent was an orderly development of the common law
as developed in Saxon times. However this may be, the Conqueror, immediately after the Conquest, in a message of reas411 THoRpE's ANc. INST. 413, 500; Hensloe's Case, 9 Co. 86, 87b, 77 Eng.
Rep. 784 (1600); Marriot v. Marriot, 1 Str. 666, 93 Eng. Rep. 770 (1726);
Montgomery v. Clark, 2 Atk. 379, 36 Eng. Rep. 628 (1762); Habergam v. Vincent, 2 Ves. Jr. 223, 39 Eng. Rep. 595 (1792).
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surance to the nation, expressed the thought that "every child
was to be his father's heir."42 Thus, it seems clear that by the end
of Henry II's reign, (1146-1216), the common law of descent
was assuming definite form, the general rule being that if the
ancestor left an heir in the descending lineal scale, he and others
standing in the same position, inherited. Precedence among the
ancestor's descendants was, according to Pollock and Maitland,
determined by six rules: "(1) A living descendant excludes his
own descendants. (2) A dead descendant is represented by his
own descendants. (3) Males exclude females of equal degree.
(4) Among males of equal degree only the eldest inherits. (5)
Females of equal degree inherit together as co-heiresses. (6) The
rule that a dead descendant is represented by his descendants
overrides the preference for the male sex, so that a grand-daughter
by a dead eldest son will exclude a younger son."43
From this general statement of principles, it is clear that the
common law originally preferred descendants before all other
kindred, and the doctrine of primogeniture had not taken undisputed control. But William's promise was destined to be broken
as the feudal system inevitably brought changes in the law of
inheritance. Forfeiture for treason under which the Crown
secured the traitor's estate, and escheat of estates resulting from
a tenant's felony, both made serious breaches in the established
law of inheritance.
Moreover, the incidents of feudal tenure made it essential that
the King's right thereto should not be split up upon the death of
his tenant and hence natural justice-equal distribution among
the heirs as tenants in common-was forced to yield to political
expediency, with the result that primogeniture 44 -inheritance by
the eldest son-became the established rule, and as an incident
thereof the doctrine of freedom of alienation became an essential
and vital doctrine of the common law. Still another incident of
this development was the necessity of revising the rules of descent
" PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, Pt. VI,
ed., London, 1948).
"2 POLLOCK AND MArrLA-ND, HSTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, Bk.
2,58 (Cambridge, 1895).
"2 POLLOCK AND MArrLAND, HIsToRY OF ENGLISH LAW, Bk.
260 (Cambridge, 1895).
On primogeniture in the United States, see article by Morris,
and Entailment of Estates in America, 27 CoL. L. REv. 24 (1927).

c. I, 675 (4th

II, c. VI, § 2,
II, c. VI, § 2,
Primogeniture
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in the light of the new doctrine of primogeniture. Within the
framework of the parentelic system, 41 the common-law courts by
a long process of judicial decision, framed a new system for the

descent of real estate, based partly on customary law and partly
on the new exigencies developed by the growth of the feudal
system. Ascendants were barred from taking, collaterals were
permitted to inherit, the doctrine of representation gained recognition, heirs of the half-blood were excluded, and the rule was

established that the heir could only inherit from an ancestor who
died actually seized.
The law of descent, except as modified by later decision, was

substantially in this state, when Sir Mathew Hale in the seventeenth century, undertook to state these rules in an organized

system in what have come to be known as Hale's Canons of
Descent. 40

This effort apparently exercised no great influence

upon the development of descent except indirectly. In 1759, however, with Hale's Canons in mind and against the background of

such further developments as had been revealed in the later de" For a full discussion of the parentelic scheme of descent, see 2 POLLOCC

A

MArLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw,

1895).

Bk. II, c. VI, § 2, 294-299 (Cambridge,

" These canons, seven in number, read as follows:

"FIRST, in descents, the law prefers the worthiest of the blood....
"SECONDLY, the next of blood is preferred before the more remote, though
equally or more remote....
"THIRDLY, that all the descendants, from such a person as by the laws
of England might have been heir to another, hold the same right by representation as that common root from whence they are derived....
"FOURTHLY, that by the law of England, without a special custom to the
contrary, the oldest son, or brother, or uncle excludes the younger; and the males
in equal degree do not all inherit; but all the daughters, whether by the same
or divers venters, do inherit together to the father; and all the sisters, by the
same venter, do inherit to the brother.
"FIFTHLY, that the last actual seisin in any ancestor, makes him, as it were,
the root of the descent, equally to many intents, as if he had been a purchaser;
and, therefore, he that cannot, according to the rules of descents, derive his succession from him that was last actually seised, though he might have derived it
from some precedent ancestor, shall not inherit....
"SIXTHLY, that whosoever derives a title to any land must be of the same
blood of the first purchaser....
"SEVENTHLY, in all successions, as well as in the line descending, transversal or ascending, the line that is first derived from a male root has always the
preference. See, 2 HArE, HIsTonRY OF Co mON LAW, 114 (5th ed., London, 1794).
"The numerical arrangement [of Hales Canons of Descent] is different from
the arrangement made by Blackstone, and the rules themselves are differently,
and perhaps, less perfectly expressed. Their chief importance arises from the fact
that they are sometimes referred to in the reported cases, and, therefore, necessary to be understood, in order to understand the decisions made." Bxicama,
TsEATis4 ON TBE LAws or DESCENTs, c. VIII, § 2, 314 (Albany, 1870).
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cisions at common law, Blackstone restated the Canons of Descent
in such classical language and in such logical form that they gradually achieved almost as much weight as if they had been enacted by Parliament. 7
As thus developed in substantially final form these Canons of
Descent revealed the following characteristics: Primogeniture
dominated the scheme; inheritance lineally descended to the
issue of the person who last died actually seized, while male
issue were preferred to female; where the only heirs were female,
they took equally; lineal descendants of any person deceased
represented their ancestor, or took per stirpes and not per capita;
"Blackstone's Commentaries, also seven in number, read as follows:
"I. The first rule is, that inheritances shall lineally descend to the issue of
the person last seized in infinitum; but shall never lineally ascend....
II. A second general rule or canon is: that the male issue shall be admitted
before the female....
"But our law does not extend to a total exclusion of females, as the Salic
law, and others, where feuds were most strictly retained. It only postpones them
to males; for though daughters are excluded by sons, yet they succeed before any
collateral relations; our law thus steering a middle course, between the absolute
rejection of females, and the putting them on a footing with males.
"III. A third rule or canon of descent is this: That where there are two or
more males, in equal degree, the eldest only shall inherit; but the females altogether....
"IV. A fourth rule, or canon of descent, is this: That the lineal descendants,
in infinitum, of any person deceased shall represent their ancestor; that is, shall
stand in the same place as the person himself would have done, had he been
living.
"Thus the child, grandchild, or great-grandchild (either male or female) of
the eldest son succeeds before the youngest son, and so in infinitum. And these
representatives shall take neither more or less, but just so much as their principals
would have done ...
"This taking by representation is called succession in stirpes, according to the
roots; since all branches inherit the same share that their root whom they represent, would have done....
"V. A fifth rule is: That on failure of lineal descendants, or issue, of the
person last seised, the inheritance shall descend to his collateral relations, being
of the blood of the first purchaser, subject to the three preceding rules....
"VI. A sixth rule or canon therefore is: That the collateral heir of the
person last seised must be his next collateral kinsman, of the whole blood ...
"VII. The seventh and last rule or cannon is: That in collateral inheritances
the male stocks shall be preferred to the female (that is, kindred derived from
the blood of the male ancentors, however remote, shall be admitted before those
from the blood of the female, however near), unless the lands have, in fact,
descended from a female." BrAcrsToNE's CoiaENAmEs, c. II, 382-397 (Sd ed.,
Chase, New York, 1890).
Blackstone's Canons of Descent, it is interesting to note, were published in the
Province of New Jersey in 1764, which was prior in point of time to their appearance in England as a part of the famous Commentaries. See, CoNnuc'ron GENERALIS: On, ThE OFFIcE, DuTY AiN AUTHoRIY OF JusTCES OF THE PEACE
(Woodbridge, New Jersey, 1764).
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collateral inheritance was valid, where such relations were of the
blood of the first purchaser; only heirs of the whole blood could
inherit; and in collateral inheritances the male stocks were to be
preferred to the female, thus giving rise to the ancestral estate,
which has created so much difficulty in our law of descent.4

VI. THE PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF
PERSONALTY FLOWS DOWN A SEPARATE AND
DISTINCT CHANNEL
A. As to Testaments.-It is usually said that the power to
dispose of personal property by testament was recognized during
the Anglo-Saxon period.49 In the sense that various forms of dis-

position, which were destined to develop into the modem testament, were being made, the assertion is true. But if by will, we
mean a disposition which is revocable, ambulatory, or which
creates a representative of the testator, the statement is not true,50
and cannot be taken at face value. Indeed, little of a definite
character is known concerning the extent of the testamentary
power during this period and under what restrictions it could
be exercised.51
Perhaps the earliest form of will was the post obit gift, which
consisted of an "actual delivery of the goods to a trustee or executor, who undertook to distribute them after the owner's death in
accordance with the latter's wishes."52 In other words, this was a
gift after death, which, at a later date, became impossible as far
" Den ex dem Delaplaine v. Jones & Searing, 8 N.J.L. 340 (1826); Cornell v.
Child & Kent, 170 App. Div. 240, 150 N.Y.S. 449 (1915).
"PAGE, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WLrs § 19 (3d ed. Cincinnati, 19411942). 1 WLL&s, TREATISE ON THE LAw OF ExEcuToRs AND ADNMuNISATORS,
1 (5th Amer. ed., Philadelphia, 1859); CRosVanx, TRaEATISE ON THE LAW BELATING TO ExEcuTroRs AND AD INISTRATORS, 4 (Boston, 1889); BLAcEroNE,
CO.M~mNTAR S, c. II, 591 (3d ed., Chase, New York, 1890). This power was also
said to include terms of years as well as goods and chattels. CoKE UPON LrrrrxTON, l11b (1st Amer. from 16th European ed., by Francis Hargrave and Charles
Butler, Philadelphia, 1812). But compare statement by Orrin K. McMurray, in
article, Liberty of Testation and Some Modern Limitations Thereon, 14 ILL. L.
REv. 100 (1919).

' 2 Poizocxr AN MArTLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, Bk. II, c. VI, § 3,
313 (Cambridge, 1895).
Ibid.
'2 JENKS, SHoRT HISTORY OF ENGLIsH LAw, c. I, 61 (4th ed., London, 1934).
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as land was concerned, because of the rule that there could be
no gift without a livery of seisin.53
During the last three hundred years of the Saxon period,
another form of disposition, known as the "death-bed distribution," appears. 54 This consisted of a statement on the part of the
dying man, his verba novissima, usually made to his confessor,
directing what disposition should be made of his property. As
these dispositions depended, for effectiveness, upon the power of
the Church, some portion of the dying man's chattels were usually
given to the Church for pious uses. It has been said that the
effect of the whole transaction amounted to the appointment by
the dying man of some person such as his confessor or a friend
who would see to the distribution of his property after death, and
that in this practice is to be found the germ from which has
developed the modern executor.
These two institutions, the post obit gift and the verba novissima (death-bed distribution), unite, during the ninth, tenth and
eleventh centuries to form the cwide (statement), which seems
to represent the final development of the will in Saxon times.""
As thus developed, it was "exceedingly formless," it was written
in the native tongue; it lacked the element of ambulatoriness;
and Pollock and Maitland 57 have expressed a doubt as to whether
it was of a truly testamentary character, in the sense of being
revocable. They base their contention upon the following
grounds: (1) That most of the wills of this period were made by
the great men of the day; (2) That the consent of the King must
be purchased by an heriot; (8) That the will had to be approved
by the bishop; (4) Finally, that the will must be executed in
duplicate or triplicate, so that one copy could be handed over
to the monastery-the main donee. Page"' contends that all this
proves nothing; that in the natural course of selection, the wills
112 PoLLocK AND M n7.AND, HISTOrY OF ENGLISa LAW, Bk. II, c. VI, § 3,
319 (Cambridge, 1895).
' 2 POLLOCK AND MArrLAND, hsoRY OF ENGmisH LAW, Bk. I, c. VI, § 3,
317 (Cambridge, 1895).
'2

POLLOCK AND MAn'LAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW,

314 (Cambridge, 1895).

Bk. II, c. VI, § 3,

'2 PoLLoCK AND MArrLAND, HISTrRY OF ENGISH LAW, Bk. II, c. VI, § 3,
319 (Cambridge, 1895).
' 2 POLLOCK Amp MArrLAND, HsTroY OF ENGLISH LAw, Bk. II, c. VI, § 3,
317, 318, 319 (Cambridge, 1895).

'PAGE,

TREATISE ON TE LAW OF WmLs § 10 (3d ed. Cincinnati, 1941-42).
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or testaments of great men, as opposed to men of lesser rank,
would survive; first, because the wills of the great, as a result of
their position in life, would be regarded as semi-public documents; second, because these men usually left something to the
Church, which naturally took measures to preserve their wills in
its archives. "In any event," he concludes, "we find some instruments which could not take effect until testator's death and
which could be revoked at pleasure." 9
1. On the Substantive Law Side.-With the Norman Conquest, no sudden change took place. The development of the
law of wills continued in much the same channels for a time.
But with the establishment of the common-law courts, which, to
protect the heir against gifts wrung from his ancestors on his
death-bed, insisted that "a boundary must be maintained against
ecclesiastical greed and the other-worldliness of dying men," and
that there must be a "real delivery of real seisin," the power to
dispose of land by the post obit gift disappeared altogether. 0° On
the other hand, the separation of the ecclesiastical from the
secular courts, already described, resulted in the introduction of
the Roman influence, and gradually transformed the Saxon will
of personalty into the modem testament, having the characteristics of ambulatoriness, in the sense of including after-acquired
property, and of being revocable at any time before death. 01
At one time during this transition period, the test as to whether a
given disposition was an ordinary conveyance or a testament depended upon whether it appointed an executor, it being thought
that a will without an executor was invalid, but this test soon disappeared."2 The Church, having perpetuated its control over the
testament on the substantive law side, strenuously contended that
it was the duty of every man to make a will in which the "dead's
part" was to be left to pious uses. It was generally thought that
to die intestate was to die unconfessed, hence it is not surprising
to find Henry I [1100-1185] promising in his Charter 63 that if a
Ibid.

2 POLLocK AND MAITLAND,
328 (Cambridge, 1895).

HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW,

Bk. II, c. VI, 327,

' WALSH, OUTLINES OF THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH AM Aimr-cAN LiW § 86,
859 (New York, 1923); 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW,
Bk. II, c. VI, § 26, 834. (Cambridge, 1895).
'2 HO.DSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LANW 420, 421 (4th ed., Boston, 1931).
§ 7. Reported in RePPY AND ToMPmNs, HISToRIcAL AND STATUTORY BACKGROUND OF THE LAW OF WILLS, c. VI, 228 (Chicago, 1928).
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man died suddenly and without opportunity to make a will, his
chattels shall be administered by his friends and the Church. The
existence of this attitude is confirmed by Bracton,64 who states
that in case of intestacy, the "dead's part" went to the Church.
During this period, as will appear later,6 5 jurisdiction over the
probate of wills was vested in the ecclesiastical courts, hence the
formation of rules concerning the execution, revocation and interpretation of testaments, was influenced by the canon or by the
civil law. Many of these rules, as thus formulated, were later to
become a part of the common law.
Whether the power to dispose by testament of all of a man's
personalty ever existed during Saxon times is not clear. But by
the time of Glanville (A.D. 1178), it was well settled that the
right to make testamentary disposition of personal property was
restricted."" And Professor Walsh thinks that: "The inference is
entirely reasonable that similar restrictions existed in Saxon times,
though not in a fixed or definite form, or protected by a special
writ as in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries." 67 Under these
restrictions the wife and children received reasonable parts recoverable by the special writ of de rationabilibonorum.68 Glanville seems to have recognized this limitation as an established
rule of the common law, and it appears to have been so regarded
even during the reign of Charles I (1649-1654). By Coke, it was
regarded as a local custom, and the fact that the limitations disappeared after the reign of Charles I lends some support to this
view."' In some localities, however, these restrictions were retained by special custom, until finally abolished by statutory enactment.7 °
"Lib. II, c. 26.
' See REPPY AND TomtmNs, HisTORICAL AND STATUTORY BACKGROUND OF
THmLAW OF WaLs, c. HI, 101 (Chicago, 1928).
" GLA vLE, Lib. VII, c. 5 (London, 1673); BRAcToN, DE LEGIBTS ET
CoNsUTDnsmuBS ANGLIAE, ff. 60b (London, 1569); 2 HoLDswowrn, HiSTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW, 559 (4th ed. Boston, 1931); MAGNA CA TA, § 26 (1215).
' WALsys, OUTLINES OF THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH AND A.mnrICAN LAW § 86,
356 (New York, 1923).
Supra note 66.
GARDNER, HANDBOOx ON THE LAW OF Wn.Ls, c. I, § 2, 9 (2d ed. St. Paul,
1916).
' 1 HOLDswOR iT, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAv, c. VII, 552, 553 (4th ed. Boston, 1931) and notes; they were swept away in the province of York by the

statute of 4 & 5 Wim. & Mary, c. 2 (1692), explained by 2 & 3 Anne, c. 5 (1703);
in Wales by the statute of 7 & 8 Win. III, c. 38 (1696); in London by the statute
of 11 Geo. I, c. 18 (1724), thus making "liberty of testation a universal principle
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This was the situation when the Wills Act of 15407- became
operative, requiring a will of realty to be in writing, but making
no provision as to formality in execution for testaments. Hence,
thereafter an oral or nuncupative testament, if proved by the
testimony of two witnesses, was effective to pass personalty as
well as a written will. The danger of an oral testament without
any restrictions as to formality was recognized, but nothing was
72
done until, as a result of the famous case of Cole v. Mordaunt,
the Statute of Frauds73 was enacted in 1676, certain sections of
which, it is supposed, were designed to meet the dangers emphasized by that case. Although the statute related primarily to
wills, it contained important provisions concerning testaments.
During the period before the Statute of Frauds, any person was
free to make a valid oral declaration of his testamentary wishes,
provided such person was in extremis. After the statute, the
verbal will remained, but it was now subject to severe restrictions,
as to the size of the estate which could be disposed of and the
formalities required in method of proof. The statute provided
that a nuncupative will, to be valid, must be proved by the oath
of three witnesses present at the making thereof, who, at the
testator's request, did bear witness that such was his will. It must
also have appeared that the will was made during the testator's
last sickness, 74 in his own habitation or dwelling or where he had
in English law." And even these statutes applied only to the restrictions upon the
testamentary power; the old rules as to intestate succession remained in effect in
these localities until abolished by the statute of 19 & 20 Vict., c. 94 (1856).
332 Hen. VIn, c. 1.
"2 Stated in note to Matthews v. Warner, 4 Ves. Jr. 186, 31 Eng. Rep. 96
(1798).
a29 Car. 11, c. 3.
'4 Concerning the term 'last sickness," RooD, A TnnATISE ON Tn LAW OF
WuLLs § 234 (2d ed. Chicago, 1926), says: "In the leading case of Prince v.
Hazelton [20 Johns (N.Y.) 502, 11 Am. Dec. 307 (1822)], Chancellor Kent
argued, and was sustained by the court in holding, that in view of the opportunities for fraud in making oral wills, the term "last sickness" in the statute must be
construed to include only the last hours of the sickness; that the last sickness is
only when the person is in extremis. Other courts have generally followed this
decision, holding that nuncupative wills can be sustained only when made from
necessity, or fear that consciousness might not remain long enough to make a
written will. It is no objection to the nuncupative will that the testator was
deluded by the hope of recovery till it was too late to make a written will,
-though warned by his physician. On the other hand, it has been held that the
will is not bad because the testator did live long enough after the nuncupation
to have made a will in writing, and was not in immediate fear of death." [Harrington v. Steeles, 82 Ill. 50, 25 Am. Rep. 290 (1876); Miller's Estate, 47 Wash.
253, 91 P. 967, 13 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1092, 14 Ann. Cas. 1163, 125 Am. St. Rep. 904
(1907)].
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previously been resident for ten days, except where such person
was surprised or taken sick, being from his home, and died before returning to his dwelling. 75 The act further provided that no
evidence could be received six months after the making of the
will, for purposes of proving the same, unless the said testimony
had been committed to writing within six days after the execution
of the will; 70 and that no will in writing concerning personalty
could be revoked by an oral will, except the same be in the life of
the testator committed to writing, read to the testator, allowed77
by him, and proved to be so done by at least three witnesses.
But aside from the requirement of writing, no additional formalities in the execution of oral wills were necessary. Thus, for example, a testament was deemed to be valid if it expressed the
testator's wishes and was reduced to writing during his lifetime,
even though unsigned.7
Three important classes of testators were excluded from the
application of the rules concerning the validity of an oral will:
79
(1) Persons disposing of estates not in excess of £30 in value;
(2) Mariners at sea; 80 (3) Soldiers in actual military service. 8'
The persons covered by these exceptions could still make oral
wills subject to the rules of law as they existed prior to 1676;
and it was still possible for all persons in their last sickness to
make nuncupative wills, provided they complied with the requirements of the statute. Obviously, the new requirements had no
bearing upon the excepted classes. Except for a statute enacted
in 1705, " which provided that all witnesses who, under the laws
and customs of the realm, were competent in an action of law,
should be deemed good witnesses to prove any nuncupative will,
or anything relating thereto, the law remained in this state until
1837.
Having observed that the separation of the ecclesiastical from
the secular courts had changed the Saxon will of personalty into
the modem testament, we may now take up the consideration of
729 Car. II, c. 3, § 19 (1676).
8Id. § 20.
7 Id. § 22.
PACE, TnE.ATISE ON THE LAW OF WILLS

'29 Car. II, c. 3, § 19 (1676).
'lId. § 23.
Ibid.
4 Anne, c. 16, § 14.

§ 232 (3d ed. Cincinnati, 1941-42).
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the effect of this development on the procedural or probate side
of testaments.
2. On the Procedural Law Side.-Among the early lawyers
there seems to have been a notion that during the Anglo-Saxon
period the grant of probate and administration belonged to the
temporal courts.8 3 This may have been true regarding administration, but as to probate no substantial evidence has been adduced. 4 Of course, "If there had been such a thing as probate
before the Norman Conquest, it would not have come before the
ecclesiastical courts, for there were none then." 5 Holdsworth
declared that neither "the civil nor the canon law sanctioned
it," 8 and Pollock and Maitland "doubt whether any such procedure as that which we call probate of a will was known in England before the time when jurisdiction over testaments had been
conceded to the church."8s
Just when the ecclesiastical courts acquired jurisdiction to
grant probate is not definitely known. It did not exist during the
twelfth century; s it was fully established by the beginning of the
fourteenth century.89 Selden, in speaking of the origin of probate,
declares: "I could never see an express probate in any particular
case earlier than about Henry III."O By the reign of Henry III
(1154-1189), the Church courts, as an incident to their control
over matters of administration, had acquired jurisdiction over
cases involving wills, hence it may be surmised that jurisdiction
Hensloe's Case, 9 Co. 36, 37b, 77 Eng. Rep. 784 (1600); Y.B. 2 Hen. VIII,
§ 12; 1 THoRPE, ANCIENT LAWS AND INSTnTUTES OF ENGLAND, 413, 500 (London,
1840); SELDEN, TnAcTs: IV. Of the Disposition or Administration of Intestates
Goods, c. I (London, 1683).
' SELDEN, TRAcrs, c. III, op. cit. p. 1672; 2 POLLOCK AND MArILAND, HisTORY oF ENGLISH LAW, 341 (2d ed. Cambridge, 1911); Dyke v. Walford, 5 Moo.
P. C. 434 (1846).
PAGE, TREATISE ON TiE LAW OF WILLS c. I, § 521 (3d ed., Cincinnati,
1941-1942).
MHOLDSOTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 625 (3d ed. Boston, 1922).
' HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 339 (Cambridge, 1895).
1 HosLswooH, HISTORY OF ENGLISr LAw 625 (3d ed. Boston, 1922).
GLANv=,

Lib. VII, c. 8 (London, 1673); Coote, PnAecE oF TaE Ec-

CLESIASTICAL CoxRTs 21-58 (London,
' SELDEN, TRACTs: III. Of the

1847).
Origin of the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction of
Testaments, c. VI (London, 1683); but compare the statement of 2 POLLOCE AND
MArTLAND, HISroRY OF ENGLisH LAW 341 (2d ed., Cambridge, 1911): "In England we do not see it (probate) until the thirteenth century has dawned, and by
that time testamentary jurisdiction belongs, and belongs exclusively, to the
spiritual courts."

ORDINANCE OF WILLAM" ThE CONQUEROR

over the granting of probate was but a step away. 91 Having jurisdiction over administration, it seemed logical that the ecclesiastical courts should also acquire a right to investigate any circumstances which might deprive them of the benefit of administration, such as a testament, alleged to have been executed by the
person deceased. " This, of course, called for proof that the testament had been executed, published and attested as the law required, and that the testator possessed a sound and disposing
mind at the time. If such proof were forthcoming, the next step
was to grant probate, which consisted of a certificate by an
authorized court that proof of compliance with the law had been
made. 3 Strenuous objection to the assumption of such control
was raised by some of the more powerful overlords, who insisted
that the wills of their tenants should be probated in the local
courts. Holdsworth suggests that this may have been a "survival
from the days when probate in the technical sense being un-'
known, the protection of the lord was sought for a will;" though
in some cases it may, as Professor Maitland suggests, have originated in later grants from a Pope. 4 By the end of the fourteenth
century, the step had been definitely taken,"5 though many elementary questions in the law of probate remained to be answered,
a fact which tended to show that
the right of granting probate
6
was of somewhat recent origin.
The right of the ecclesiastical courts to grant probate, once
established, remained in their hands for a period of over four
hundred years, subject, of course, to various minor statutory
changes. The first of these statutory interferences came as early
as 1857. In that year, complaints of overcharging by the ecclesiastical courts for the probate of wills, led to a statutory
warning by the King, of the Archbishop of Canterbury, as well as
all other bishops, that they should amend the law of their own
accord, or the King would cause his justices to inquire of "such
11

HoLDswonTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW

625 (3d ed. Boston, 1922).

0 Ibid.

As to the procedure in probating a testament, see

HIsTORicAL AND STATUTORY BACKGROUND OF

1928).

REPPY

Am

=s LAW OF WILLS

To~nxmNs,

112 (Chicago,

1 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 625 (3d ed. Boston, 1922).
SGLANvLLE, Lib. VII, c. 8 (London, 1673).
2 PoLLoCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 362 (2d ed. Cambridge, 1911).
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oppressions and exactions, to hear them and determine them as
well at the King's suit, as at the suit of the party as in old time
hath been used."9 7 Indeed, this warning was contained in the
same statute of 1357 which took the actual administration out
of their hands. But the warning went unheeded; the avarice and
greed of the Church officials overcame prudence, so that in 1416,
or just fifty-nine years later, the matter again became the subject
of statutory regulation.

The statute provided that no ordinary

should take for probate of any testament, or for anything appertaining thereto, "no more than was accustomed and used in
this part in the time of the said Edward the Third, upon pain to
yield him that feeleth him grieved the treble so received, if he
will sue by the course of the law, so that all manner of executors
shall yield their accounts to the ordinaries, wholly of the testator's
goods." This act remained in operation for but one year, as the
ordinaries promised to reform and amend the oppressions and
exactions. The promise was not kept; indeed, the oppression was
augmented, so that Parliament was forced to intervene once again.
The statute99 enacted on this occasion regulated the fees to be
demanded by the ecclesiastical courts in granting probate and
administration, and also prescribed severe pains and penalties for
any violation of such regulations. It provided that "nothing should
be taken for the probate of a will, and making inventories, where
the goods do not exceed £5, except 6d. to the clerk; where they
do not exceed £40, not more than 8s. 6d.; and where they exceed
that, 5s."100
The next change was made by the Statute of Frauds,' 0 ' in
connection with the probate of nuncupative testaments. The
statute provided that six months after the speaking of the pretended testamentary words, no testimony should be received to
prove any nuncupative will, except where such testimony had
been committed to writing within six days after the execution of
such will; that probate of such testaments should not be granted
until at least fourteen days after the decease of the testator, nor
could proof of such a will be made without notice to the widow
'31 Edw. m,Stat. I, c. 4 (1357).
3 Hen. V, c. 8.
21 Hen. VIII, c.5 (1529).
x®4 BRxEvs, ISTORY oF ENGLISH
phia, 1880).
'*

'1029 Car. II, c. 3 (1676).

LAw, c. 28, 304 (Finlason

ed., Philadel-
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or next of kin, to the end that they might contest the probate.102
Otherwise, jurisdiction over the grant of probate of wills concerning personal estate was to remain in the ecclesiastical courts as of
yore. 0 3 The alterations thus introduced by the Statute of Frauds
concerning nuncupative testaments were made perpetual by the
Statute of 1 Jac. II, cap. 17, sec. 5 [1685-1688].
In 1705, came an act 04 designed to facilitate the granting of
probate of wills of persons dying intestate, having monies or
wages due for work done in the yards and docks of England. It
was enacted that the power of granting probate of the wills of
such persons should be in the ordinary of the diocese, where such
person or persons should die, and that the "salary, wages, or pay
due to such person or persons from the Queen's Majesty, her heirs,
or successors, for work done in any of the yards or docks, shall
not be taken or deemed to be Bona notabilia, whereby to found
the jurisdiction of the perogative court."10 5
The next statute, enacted in 1798,106 provided for the administration of the assets of deceased persons where the executor to
whom probate had been granted was out of the realm. It also
provided that when an infant was made sole executor, administration with the will annexed should be granted to the guardian of
such infant, until such infant should reach his majority, at which
time probate of the will was to be granted to him.07 But in the
meantime, the person to whom administration should be granted
was to have the same powers vested in him as an administrator
by virtue of an administration granted to him durante minore
aetate of the next of kin. 08
B. As to Distribution.-Ofthe law of intestate succession of
chattels during the Saxon period, we have no real record. 10 9
What knowledge we have is the result of certain inferences which
have been drawn from the state of the law as found in the early
" Id. secs. 20, 21.
" Id. see. 24.
"'4 Anne c. 16.
' Id. see. 26.
38 Geo.

m,

0 Id. sec. 6.
Id. see. 7.
a 2 POLLOcK
bridge, 1911).

c. 87.
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part of the Norman era."' Thus, we know that the power of
testamentary disposition was subject to certain restrictions on
alienation in favor of heirs. Indeed, one writer" suggests that
the law of inheritance may have grown out of the restriction on
wills, the exact character of which does not definitely appear
until shortly after the Conquest."'
By the time of Glanville (A.D. 1178), it was settled that the
power of bequeathing personal property by testament had certain
limits, which were due to a fairly well defined scheme of intestate
succession." 3 These limitations have been thus described:
If a man had a wife and children, he could dispose by will
of one-third of his personal property. At his death his widow
took one of the remaining thirds, his children the other. If
he had children, but no wife, or a wife and no children, he
could dispose of one-half of his personal property, the
widow or children taking the other half. The shares of the
wife and children were called their 'reasonable parts' and
the writ rationabiliparte bonorum lay to recover them, it
being maintainable against executors, founded upon a complaint that they unjustly detained from the plaintiff the
reasonable parts of the goods and chattels which were of
the deceased and refused to deliver the same."14
Most of the restrictions upon the right of intestate succession
to chattels were removed during the fourteenth century, except
in certain localities where they were continued by local custom."15
Thus, if a man died without a testament, his chattels were distributed according to the law of intestate succession,""' which had
continued from Saxon times, and which, as an incident of the
ecclesiastical court's control over probate, had also fallen within
't WALSH, OUTLINES OF THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH AND A2mERICAN LAW C. XV,

sec.

4, 356 (New York, 1928).
m
11

Bus

id. at 361.
7 GLAw Lvx,
c. 5

(London,

1673); BnAcToN,

DE LEcBus .T CoNSULTUN-

ft. 60b (London, 1569); 2 HoLUswoRTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAWv,
559 (4th ed., Boston, 1931); MAGNA CARTA, sec. 26 (1215).
= ibid.
n GARNER, HANDBOOK ON THm LAw OF WILs, c. I, sec. 2, 9 (2d ed., St.
ANGLAE,

Paul,'11916).
WALSH,

OUns

(New York, 1928); 2

OF THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH AND A
nI.cAN LAv 361
HoLnswoRTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 436, 437 and notes

(Boston, 1927); see also "History of the Law of Wills and Testaments" in REPPY

AND ToMPmIs, HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY BACKGROUND OF THE LAw OF WILLS,

8, n. 54 (Chicago, 1928).
-' In 1856 uniformity in the law of intestate succession to chattels was established throughout England by the Statute of 19 & 20 Vict. c. 94.
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that court's jurisdiction. Thus, where no testament appeared upon

the death of a decedent, the Ordinary took control of the disposal
of the personal estate, being bound only in good conscience to
pay the debts of the intestate. By the Statute of Westminster II
(1285) 1 7 the Ordinary was subjected to the suits of creditors as

were executors. By a statute enacted in 1357,"' the ecclesiastical
courts were required to grant administration to the nearest and

most lawful friends of the deceased, and this was the origin of
administrators, who were thus placed by this statute on the same
footing as executors. In spite of these provisions the ecclesiastical
courts continued to exercise jurisdiction over administration, including the distribution of the surplus of the personal estate accruing to the kindred of the intestate according to the rules of
the common law. This practice was tolerated as the Ordinaries,
in the bonds taken by the administrators to account with them,
usually included a provision that the surplus upon such account-

ing should be distributed as the Ordinary should direct. In time,
this matter came to the attention of the common-law courts and
they took the view that the bond of the administrator was of no

avail and that the Ordinary was not compellable to make distribution. In consequence, when the ecclesiastical courts attempted to
compel a distribution, a writ of prohibition issued. And while affairs were in this state, in an effort to end the contention between

the common law and ecclesiastical courts, to enlarge and confirm
their jurisdiction over intestate personal estates, the Civilians, in
1670 succeeded in having enacted the Statute of Distributions." 9
"'13 Edw. I, c. 19.
' 31 Edw. II, c. 11.
"' 31 Edw. III, c. 11. In this connection, Plucknett in his distinguished treatise
on LEGiSLArON oF EDwAD I, c. I, 9-10 (Oxford, 1949), made the following observation:
"One of the most striking examples [of legislation] is to be seen in the position
of executors. In Maitland's words, 'a change as momentous as any that a statute
could make, was made without statute and very quietly when for the first time
the courts of Edward I gave actions of debt for and against executors. This step
was of the utmost gravity. It abruptly closed the development of the English heir
along the lines of the Roman haeres. By recognizing the executor as an institution
of English law for the purpose of dealing with the decedent's chattels although
preserving the descent of land to the heir, it cut our law of property permanently
into two separate portions, and so it has remained until the present century.
This statute was adopted in Virginia in 1705, 3 Hen. St. L. 371; continued
in the Revised Laws of 1748, 5 Hen. St. L. 444; and remained in full force until
the Revision of 1785 went into effect. Davis v. Rowe, 6 Rand. (Va.) 355 (1828).
The Statute of Distributions provided:
"It is enacted that the surplusage of intestates' estates (except of femes-

KENTJcIO

LAw JouRNAL

Under this statute, which was borrowed from the Civil Law, a
scheme for the distribution of personal property was evolved or
took final shape, the provisions of which stood in striking contrast to the common-law canons of descent. Primogeniture was
abandoned in favor of the heirs or distributees taking equally as
tenants in common; males were no longer preferred over females;
inheritance was no longer limited to the blood of the first purchase; the half-blood were not to be excluded; and property was
permitted to lineally ascend as well as descend, 20 and among
collaterals and ascendants, the gradual scheme of distribution,
as opposed to the parentelic scheme of descent, which prevailed
in the inheritance of real property, prevailed.' 21
VII. THE REUNION OF THE LAW OF WILLS AND
TESTAMENTS IN ENGLAND
A. On the Substantive Law Side.-As previously observed, at
the time the Ordinance of 1072 was put into operation the common-law courts acquired jurisdiction over devises of real estate,
covert, which are left as at conmmon law), shall, -after the expiration of one full
year from the death of the intestate, be distributed in the following manner:
"One-third shall go to the widow of the intestate, and the residue in equal
proportions to his children, or, if dead, to their representatives; that is, their lineal
descendants: if there are no children or legal representatives subsisting, then a
moiety shall go to the widow, and a moiety to the next of kindred in equal degree
and their representatives; if no widow, the whole shall go to the children: if
neither widow nor children, the whole shall be distributed among the next of
kin in equal degree and their representatives: but no representatives are admitted,
among collaterals, farther than the cfifldren of the intestate's brothers and sisters.
The next of kindred, here referred to, are to be investigated by the same rules of
consanguinity, as those who are entitled to letters of administration; of whom we
have sufficiently spoken. And therefore by this statute the mother, as well as
the father, succeeded to all the personal effects of their children, who died intestate and without wife or issue: in exclusion of the other sons and daughters,
the brothers and sisters of the deceased.
"And so the law still remains with respect to the father; but by statute 1 Jac.
II, Cap. 17 [1685], if the father be dead, and any of the children die intestate
without wife or issue, in the lifetime of the mother, she and each of the remaining
children, or their representatives, shall divide his effects in equal portions." 22
& 23 Car. II, Cap. 10 [1670].
Speaking of the liberality of the Statute, in Edwards v. Freeman, 2 P. vms.
441, 443, 24 Eng. Rep. 803, 806 (1724), Raymond, Ld.C.J., said:
"The Statute of Distributions does not break into any settlement that has been
made by the father; it only meddles with what is left undisposed of by him, and
of that only, makes such a Will for the intestate, as a father, free from the
partiality of affections, would himself make; and this I may call a Parliamentary
Will. The intention of making the children equal, goes through the whole Act."
'REPPY AN TompKINs, HIsTORicAL AND STATUTORY BACKGROUND OF
LAW OF WmnLs, c. II, 93 (Chicago, 1928).
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and as an incident thereof, over descent, if indeed, that power
was not already in their hands. In this state of affairs the first substantive formality required for the execution of wills, that of writing, was laid down in the Wills Act of 1540,122 carried forward by
the Bill Concerning the Explanation of Wlls,'1 23 with additional

formalities added by the Statute of Frauds. 24 In none of these
statutes, proof aside, were any formalities in execution of testaments required. This was the situation when the Wills Act of
1837125 was enacted. The phrase "no will," as used in that statute,
included both wills and testaments. Hence, the requirements of
the Wills Act of 1540,1-6 the Statute of Frauds,2 7 together with
the additional formalities in execution required by the new Act,

now were required for both wills and testaments. Under the new
Act, the decisional ruling permitting the testator to make good
by acknowledging a signature made out of the presence of the
witnesses, took statutory form, the dispute as to the position of
the testators signature was resolved by requiring it to be at the
foot or end of the will, the number of attesting witnesses was
reduced, and the attestation of each witness was to be in the
presence of the others. Now, for purposes of bar examinations,

the student is usually told by his instructor, that the significance
of the statute consists in the fact that it laid down the same
formalities in execution for both wills and testaments. This is
true, but it should be pointed out that a much deeper significance
lics in the fact, that after a period of almost eight hundred years
in which the law as to real property insofar as it was the subjectmatter of a will, had been flowing down a separate and distinct
channel from the law of personalty, there was a reunion of the law
of wills and testaments on the substantive law side.
On the procedural side, the separation still continued, and it
still remained true that the only mode of probating a will of real
estate was by bringing an action of ejectment, as the old rule
that the decree of the ecclesiastical court admitting to probate a
' 32 Hen. VIII, e. 1, as modified by the Statute of Wills of 1542, 34 & 35
Hen. VIII, e. 5.
34 & 35 Hen. VIII, e. 5 (1542-1543).
"29 Car. II, c. 3 (1676).
"7 Win. IV & 1 Viet. e. 26.
Supra note 122.
Supra note 124.
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will including both real and personal property was only prima
facie evidence as to title to personalty.
B. On the ProceduralLaw Side.-The ecclesiastical courts, as
a result of William's Ordinance acquired jurisdiction over the
probate of testaments of personal property, and, as an incident
thereof, control of the distribution of the dead man's personalty
if he died intestate. As testaments were not infrequently included
in wills disposing of realty, which were subject to probate in the
ecclesiastical court, a question naturally arose as to the validity
of the decree of probate on title to realty included therein. As the
ecclesiastical court had no jurisdiction over freehold estates, its
decree was only prima facie evidence as to title to real estate,
although conclusive as to personalty. This forced the devisee
under a will to resort to the action of ejectment previously described as a method of probating a will and conclusively establishing his title to the real estate involved. This situation continued until the enactment of the Court of Probate Act of 1857.128
Under this act jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts and all
other courts of probate, was abolished, and the power, both as to
wills and testaments, was vested in a new court called the Court
of Probate, whose decree became conclusive evidence as to title
as to both real and personal property, when mingled together in
a single instrument of disposition. Thus, at last, after a period of
many centuries, there was a reunion of the law of wills and testaments on the probate or procedural side.'2 9
C. As to Descent and Distribution.-The rules of descent as
enumerated by Blackstone 30 and the scheme of distribution as
formulated in the Statute of Distributions,' 31 remained in sub-

stantially the same form until 1833, at which time the Inheritance
Act 32 worked a tremendous change in the system of inheritance
as developed at common law, finally giving ground to the equalitarian doctrines of the common law as illustrated by the provisions
of the Statute of Distributions,'13 3 the canon law and the statute
20 & 21 Vict. c. 77.
' Supreme Court of Judicature Act of 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. V, c. 19.
"3
& 4 Win. IV, c. 106.
1 122 & 23 Car. II, c. 10 (1670).
21 8 & 4 Wim. IV, c. 106, 78 Stat. at Large 1002.
" 22 & 28 Car. II, c. 10 (1670).
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both being the direct result of the separation of the ecclesiastical
35
courts under the Ordinance of 1072.134 In 1856, a second statute'
designed to bring about nationwide uniformity in the distribution
of personal estates of persons dying intestate, was enacted. It
abolished the customary rules as to intestate succession, as handed
down from Saxon times; in the city of London, the Provinces of
York and in Wales. These changes were carried forward by the
Intestate's Estates Act of 1890,136 which was followed by the Law

of Property Act of 1922'I S and the Administration of Estates Act
of 1925,138 under which the distinctions between real and personal
property, as far as the devolution of property is concerned, were
abolished. In short, there was, under these statutes, a reunion
of the law of real and personal property on the devolution side,
the question being no longer who takes the realty by descent or
who takes the personalty by distribution, but who inherits the
intestate's property, without regard to its character.
VIII. THE STATUS OF THE LAW OF SUCCESSION
IN ENGLAND AT THE TIME IT WAS ADOPTED
IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES
But at the time we adopted our law of succession from England-just prior to, during, or shortly after the American Revolution-the reunion of the law of wills and testaments on both the
substantive and procedural sides was still far in the distance1837 and 1858 respectively-while the reunion of the law of descent of realty and the distribution of personalty, which was partially achieved under the Inheritance Act of 1833, "$9 was not to be
consummated until the Administration of Estates Act 140 was en-

acted in 1922.
In substantially this form the English law of succession, both
substantive and procedural, became law in the colonies. Thus,
we find that in the several colonies the power to make testamen"'Reported in REPPY Arm TompmNs, HIsToRCAL AND STATUTORY BACKGnoUND oF Tnm LAW OF Wm.Ls, c. VL, 278 (Chicago, 1928).

19 & 20 Vict. c. 94.
53 & 54 Vict. c. 29.
12 & 13 Geo. V, c. 16.
"115 Ceo. v, c. 23.
3 & 4iWm. IV, c. 106.
",o 15 Geo. V, c. 23.
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tary disposition of both real and personal property existed almost
from the beginning. In a New Jersey case, decided in 1889, the
court declared:
The Statute of Wills [32 Hen. VIII, c. 1 (1540)]
was never formally enacted in this state; nevertheless the
power of disposing of real estate by will always existed, and
has been exercised from the earliest period of our colonial
government. The Act of March 17, 1714, as its title indicates, was an act confirming wills then made and thereafter
to be made, rather than an act prescribing141new rules and
ceremonies to be observed in making wills.
It is clear, therefore, that the earliest colonists on the Atlantic seaboard brought with them the law of succession which, having
been modified by the Wills Act of 1540,142 recognized the right
to make a will of realty and have the title of the devisee thereunder made conclusive in an action of ejectment and the right to
make a testament of personalty and have the title thereunder
made conclusive by a decree of probate issued by the ecclesiastical court. It is equally clear that the colonists brought with them
two systems of intestate succession-the common-law canons of
descent founded on the feudal system, disregarding natural affection and natural justice-and the Statute of Distribution, borrowed from the Civil Law, under which personalty was distributed according to the presumed intent of the intestate, and
suited, by its invocation of the quality of partition, to the genius
of our infant government. These rights were recognized in New
York as early as 1629 in the Charter of Freedoms and Exemptions, 143 confirmed as an incident of socage tenure in 1664 under
the Duke's Laws, 44 and in the Act of October 22, 1644, which
provided that "all persons of the age of twenty-one years might
devise their lands." 45 The Statute of Frauds, 4 enacted in England in 1676, provided that wills were to be in writing, signed by
the testator or by his direction, and attested in his presence by
three or four credible witnesses. It seems to have been extended
1 t

Mickle v. Matlack, 17 N.J.L. 86, 93 (1839).
Hen. VIII, c. 1.
'FoLE
HisToRY OF REAL PnoPERTY LAvW m Nmv Yorm, c. I, 7 (New
York, 1895).
1,4Id. at 18.
SIbid.
...
29 Car. II, c. 3.
14232
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to the Province of New York, 147 and so also the act further regulating wills in the English plantations must have been in effect

prior to Independence. 48 If this be true, the law as to devises of
real estate in New York was substantially the same as in England,

requiring the same formalities in execution, with the legal title of
the devisee subject to probate by action of ejectment in the same
manner as in England, as the decree of the probate court, mingling real and personal property was, as in England, only prima
facie evidence as to title to realty.
Coming to the subject of descent, according to Fowler, with

the termination of hostilities at the close of the Revolution, the
New York Legislature in the year 1782,149 passed the first of a
series of acts affecting real property. He declared:
This act converted estates tail into estates in fee
simple absolute; it abolished primogenture 5 0 as a rule of
descents, and made real estate partible inheritance, in which
all the issue of equal degree shared alike, and in default of
issues the estates went in equal shares per stirpes to the
next of blood of the last owner. Until the passage of this
act the canons of descents had been wholly regulated in
New York by the English law.' 51

The new law of descent thus perpetuated in 1782 was carried
on down, and a fair picture of its character and scope may be seen
in Kent's Canons of Descent, 5 2 which appeared in 1835. The law
"' F owLzn,

HISTony OF REAL PROPERTY LAW IN NEW YomK, c. IV, 73 (New
York, 1895).
14825 Geo. II, c. 6 (1752).
149
N.Y.L. 1782, Sess. 6, c. 2, revised in 1786, 1 Jones & Varick, 245. See, also,
Jackson ex dem v. Van Zandt, 12 Johns. 169 (1815).
" "In a few of the colonies the doctrine of primogeniture gained a temporary recognition. It existed in Rhode Island until the year 1770; in New Jersey,
New York, Georgia and a few other states, until the revolution; in Maryland as
late as 1815. In New Jersey the rule was modified by the Descent Act of 1780,
under which the eldest son was given a double portion of the estate. A similar
state of affairs existed in Massachusetts, Connecticut aind Delaware. Under the
Descent Act of 1817 the last vestige of primogeniture was eliminated in New
Jersey, except in the case of a natural trust, in which case the estate descended
to the eldest son, according to the law of primogeniture, such estates not being
within the purview of the New Jersey statutes; and also except in the case of an
estate tail, until changed by the Descent Act of 1820." REPPY AND Tomrxnrs,
HIsTorucAx A" STATUTORY BACKGROUND OF THE LAw OF Wmrs, c. II, 81 (Chicago, 1928).
" FowLn, HmsoRY OF REAr PRoPERTY LAw iN NEW YoRK, c. IV, 73 (New
York, 1895).
'These canons, eight in number, read as follows:
"I. The first rule of inheritance is, that if a person owning real estate dies
seized, or as owner, without devising the same. The estate shall descend to his
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of descent as set forth by Kent in general followed the scheme of
inheritance as outlined by Hale and Blackstone, subject to statutory and decisional changes in new cases, and to the equalitarian
influence of the Statute of Distributions. This influence, however,
failed to establish a single method of devolution for both real
and personal property, yet, to the extent it attempted to apply
lawful descendants in the direct line of lineal descent; and if there be but one
person, then to him or her alone, and if more than one person, and all of equal
degree of consanguinity to the ancestor, then the inheritance shall descend to the
several persons as tenants in common, in equal parts, however remote from the
intestate the common degree of consanguinity may be..
"II. The second rule of descent is, that if a person dying seized, or as owner
of land, leaves lawful issue of different degrees of consanguinity, the inheritance
shall descend to the children and grandchildren of the ancestor, if any be living,
and to the issue of such children or grandchildren as shall be dead, and so on to
the remotest degree, as tenants in common. But such grandchildren and their
descendants shall inherit only such share as their parents respectively would have
inherited if living.
III. A third canon of inheritance, prevailing to a considerable extent in this
country, is, that if the owner of lands dies without lawful descendants, leaving
parents, the inheritance shall ascend to them, either first to the father and next
to the mother, or jointly, under certain qualifications....
"IV. If the intestate dies without issues or parents, the estate goes to his
brothers and sisters, and their representatives. If there be several such relatives,
and all of equal degree of consanguinity to the intestate, the inheritance descends
to them in equal parts, however remote from the intestate the common degree of
consanguinity may be. If they all be brothers and sisters, or nephews and nieces,
they inherit equally; but if some be dead leaving issue, and others living, then
those who are living take the share they would have taken if all had been living,
and the descendants of those who are dead inherit only the share which their
parents would have received if living. The rule applies to other direct lineal
descendants of brothers and sisters, and the taking per capita when they stand in
equal degree, and taking per stirpes when they stand in different degrees of consanguinity to the common ancestor, prevails as to collaterals, to the remotest degree, equally as in the descent to lineal heirs....
"V. In default of lineal descendants, and parents, and brothers and sisters,
and their descendants, the inheritance ascends to the grandparents of the intestate,
or to the survivor of them....
"VI. In default of lineal descendants, and parents, and brothers and sisters,
and their descendants, and grandparents, the inheritance goes to the brothers and
sisters, equally of both the parents of the intestate, and their descendants. If all
stand in equal degree of consanguinity to the intestate, they take per capita; and
if in unequal degree, they take per stirpes....
"VII. If the inheritance came to the intestate of the part of his father, then
the brothers and sisters of the father, and their descendants, shall have preference;
and, in default of them, the estate shall descend to the brothers and sisters of
the mother, and their descendants. But if the inheritance came to the intestate
on the part of his mother, then her brothers and sisters, and their descendants,
have the preference; and, in default of them, the brothers and sisters on the
father's side, and their descendants, take....
"VIII. On failure of heirs under the preceding rules, the inheritance descends
to the remaining next of kin to the intestate, according to the rules in the English
statute of distributions of the personal estate, subject to the doctrine in the
preceding rules in the different states, as to the half-blood, and as to ancestral
estates, and as to the equality of distributions." 4 Kr's
CozramNrAnims, 375-413
(13th Am. ed. 1884).
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the statute's principles of equal division in the descent of realty,
it was a step in that direction.
The problem in New York, therefore, was the same as in
England after 1072 and before 1837 and 1853, that is, how was a
reunion of the law of wills and testaments, on both the substantive and procedural sides, and a reunion of the law of the
devolution of real and personal property, to be brought about?
IX.

THE REUNION OF THE LAW OF TESTATE AND
INTESTATE SUCCESSION IN NEW YORK

A. As to the Substantive Law of Wills and Testaments.-Prior
to the enactment of the first English Wills Act of 1540,' 53 which
was in force in the Province of New York, the only formality on
execution required for a will of real estate was that it be in
writing.15 4 After 1691, according to Fowler, 5 5 the Statute of
Frauds, as enacted in England, was regarded as extended to
England, thus expanding the requirements as to execution of wills
to include, above that of writing, that a will of a freehold estate
should include the additional formalities of a signature by the
testator, or by some other in his presence and by his direction,
and attestation by three or four credible witnesses in the presence
of the testator. Under these two statutes, therefore, the same
division between wills and testaments, as existed in England prior
to 1831, operated in Provincial New York, or the formalities in
execution provided by these statutes applied only to wills, not to
testaments. This separation of the law of wills and testaments on
the substantive law side continued until after the first state constitution in 1777, Section XXXV of which provided:
That such parts of the common law of England, and
of the statute law of England and Great Britain, and of the
acts of the legislature of the colony of New York, as together did form the law of the said colony on the nine32 Hen. VIII, c. 1 & c. 5.
Matter of Roe, 82 Misc. 567, 143 N.Y.S. 288 (1913).
"The Statute of Frauds (29 Car. II [16761) being enacted after New York
bad a legislature of its own, was not in force in New York sthicti juris; but we
had here earlier laws requiring deeds to be in writing. After 1691 the English
statute was probably regarded as extending here, for otherwise why was it reenacted in Jones and Varick's Revision?" FowLER, HSTORY OF REAL PROPERTY
LAW iN NEW Your, c. IV, 78, n. 7 (New York, 1895).
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teenth day of April, in the year of our Lord, one thousand
seven hundred and seventy-five, shall be and continue the

law of this state; subject to such alterations and provis tns
as the legislature of this state shall, from time to time, make
concerning the same. 0 0

Under the authority of Section XXXV of the New York State
Constitution, the Wills Act of 1540, with its several amendments,
was reenacted.0 7 These enactments were confirmed and carried
by statute in 180108 and in 1813.1 Until the Revision of 1830,10
our law of wills corresponded with the law of wills in England
and which had been in force in the Province of New York.' 0'
Under the Revision of 1830, Section 40, now Section 21 of the
New York Decedent's Estate Law, provided that "Every last will
and testament of real and personal property," should meet the
same formalities in execution, thus resulting in the reunion of the
law of wills and testaments in New York on the substantive law
side-a development which was to come a few years later in England.
B. As to the Proceduralor Probate Side of the Law of Wills
and Testaments.-But it still remained true that where both real
and personal property were disposed of by the same will, a decree
of probate admitting such instrument to probate, was only prima
facie evidence as to title to real estate, but conclusive as to title
to personalty in New York, following the common-law rule as
developed by the ecclesiastical courts, although the reason for
the rule in England, to-wit, the separation of the common-law
and ecclesiastical courts by the Ordinance of 1072, never had
been in existence in the State of New York. Apparently the courts
of New York first faced this problem in the case of Stewart's
" NEv Yomn STATE CONSTITUTiON OF 1777, see. XXXV.
' 2 Jones & Varick, 10th Section, c. XLVII, par. 2, 93 (March 3, 1787).
I Kent & Radcliffe Revision, 24th Session, c. IX, par. 2, 178 (Feb. 20,
1801).
Revised Laws of New York, 36th Session, c. XXIII, par. 2, 864 (1818).
'Revised Statutes of New York, c. 6, tit. I, Art. III, see. 40, 63 (1829), to
become operative January 1, 1830.
"In Gryle v. Gryle [2 Atk. 176, 26 Eng. Rep. 1761, in the year 1741, it
was again argued that, if the witnesses did not act together on one occasion, the
testator might be sane when some attesting witnesses attested, and insane when
others attested. But the court held that the old statute of wils, as amended by
the statute of frauds, did not require the simultaneous presence of the attesting
witnesses. This decision was binding on the Privy Council and consequently on
appeals from the Province of New York. Thus the law of New York was fixed."
In re Roes Will, 82 Misc. 565, 143 N.Y.S. 999, 1001 (Surf. Ct., N.Y. Co., 1913).
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Exr's v. Lispenard,6 2 in which the Court of Errors, in a case where
the will mingled the disposition of real and personal property
and was contested on the ground of a lack of testamentary capacity, held that the testator was competent to execute the will
and that the personalty passed under it, while in a subsequent
action of ejectment to probate the will, a jury found that the
testator was incompetent and hence the realty passed as in the
case of intestacy.
In the case of In re Goldstickers Will,16 3 decided as late as

1908, in which the court held that a will devising realty and bequeathing personalty was conclusive evidence as to the title to the
personalty but only prima facie evidence as to title to realty, Chief
Justice Cullen, of the Court of Appeals, declared:
The general principle that a judgment or final determination in a judicial proceeding concludes the parties thereto
upon all matters necessarily decided therein whenever they
are put in issue in other litigations is unquestioned. Nor
can it be well questioned that this principle obtains as to
decrees of surrogate's or probate courts on other matters,
than the probating of wills. 1 Freeman on Judgments (4th
ed.) § 319b; 2 Black on Judgments,- § 633. That this
proposition should be open to limitations or to doubt as to
the decrees of such courts on the admission or rejection
of wills arises from two circumstances: First, at common
law the factum of a will was as to real estate solely cognizable by courts of law, while as to personalty it was
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts;
and, second, the peculiar and somewhat loose method of
procedure in the ecclesiastical courts (which is the original
source of our own procedure; Matter of Brick Estate, 15
Abb. Prac. 12 [1862]) on the probate of wills. The title
of the executor was derived from his letters testamentary,
for which the probate of the will was necessary. The title
to real estate under a will could be asserted in an action at
law, the same as under a deed or any other source of title,
although the will had never been proved in the ecclesiastical
courts (Harrisv. Harris,26 N. Y. 483 [1863] ), and it followed that a decree in that court was without force or
effect in an action at law as to the realty. The converse of
that proposition was also true that a judgment in an action
at law was without force in the probate proceedings in the
.6226 Wend. 255 (N.Y. 1841).

1- 192 N.Y. 35, 84 N.E. 581 (1908).
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ecclesiastical courts,.. . See Delafield v. Parish,25 N. Y. 28
[1862]. The Revised Statutes provided for the probate of
wills of real estate in the surrogate's court, but the effect
of such probate was merely to effect a record of the will,
which record could be offered in evidence in lieu of the
original, the same as the record of a deed. Subsequently
the probate before the surrogate of a will of realty was made
presumptive evidence of its valid execution. In Corley v.
McElmeel, 149 N. Y. 228, 48 N.E. 628 [1896], relying on
the general principle of the conclusiveness of judgments
and the fact that the Code did not provide in terms for the
effect of a decree rejecting a will, the appellants contended
that such decree was conclusive against the devisees in an
action of partition. This contention was over-ruled by this
court. Our decision was not, however, based on the omission of the Code to specify the effect of the decree rejecting
a will, but on the ground that at common law the decree of
the probate court was not conclusive in actions relating to
real estate, and, as in such actions the parties had been entitled to a determination of the question of the valid execution of the will by a jury, that it was doubtful at least
whether the Legislature could deprive them of that right.
With the law in this state, and perhaps as a direct result of
In re Goldsticker's Will,'64 decided in 1908, the Legislature of
New York in 1910 took cognizance that the general principle that
a judgment or final determination in a judicial proceeding concludes the parties to all matters necessarily decided therein, had
no application to decrees of probate involving wills which included in their disposition both real and personal property. They
realized that this exception to the general rule was a hangover
from the common law, but there is nothing in the New York
decisions or in the statutory annotations to indicate that anyone
at that time connected or traced the difficulty to the separation
of the spiritual and lay courts by the Ordinance of William the
Conqueror in 1072. Notwithstanding this lack of light, the Legislature faced up to the issue and enacted a statute which read:
A decree admitting a will of real or personal property, or both, to probate is conclusive as an adjudication of
the validity of the will, and of the question determined
under section twenty-six hundred and twenty-four of this
act, except as in this chapter otherwise provided."'1 5
14 ibid.
1w Rev. Stat. of N.Y., Pt. II, c. 6, tit. 2, sec. 1; 2 Laws of N.Y. 1910; c. 578,
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Thus, as by statutory enactment, a reunion of the law of wills
and testaments on the procedural or probate side was realized in
New York.
C. As to the Devolution of Real and Personal Property.-At
common law, if a man died intestate owning both real and personal property, the question was, who took the realty by descent,
and who took the personalty by distribution? If the person claiming to take was an heir he took according to the rules of descent
as stated by Blackstone; if the person claiming to take was a
distributee, he took according to rules of distribution as formulated by the Statute of Distributions. Each system, in its development, had been influenced by the Ordinance of William the Conqueror separating the spiritual and lay courts, and each system
had revealed distinct and widely divergent characteristics, all of
which were adopted in substance during the colonial period.
Except for occasional modification by statute, or decision, these
rules regulating the law of succession came down practically
intact in New York until the year 1929, when the legislature
abolished the distinctions between real and personal property,
and in Section 88 of the Statute of Devolution,"6 made provision
for the distribution of the property of intestate decedents, without
regard to whether the property involved was real or personal. In
framing the specific provisions of the statute, did the legislators
adopt the parentelic scheme of descent as stated by Blackstone,
the gradual scheme of distribution as formulated by the Statute
of Distributions, or did it adopt a scheme of distribution of the
decedent's property considered as a mass, in which were included
the better features of the common-law canons of descent governing the distribution of freehold estates and the civil law rules
of distribution as stated in the Statute of Distributions? The
answer to this query can only be ascertained by setting out verbatim the sixteen paragraphs of Section 83 of the New York
Statute of Devolution, and then commenting on whether each
paragraph followed the canons of descent or the statutory rules
of distribution. The first provision of Section 83 reads as follows:
see. 1, p. 1416 (see. 2625, Code of Civil Procedure); 2 Laws of N.Y. 1914, c. 448,
p. 1812 (see. 2625, Code of Civil Procedure); sec. 155 Surr. Ct. Act.
'"N.Y. Laws 1929, amending N.Y. Laws 1909, Real Property Law, Art. III.
Effective Sept. 1, 1930.
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"The real property of a deceased person, male or female, not
devised, shall descend, and the surplus of his or her personal
property, after payment of debts or legacies, and if not bequeathed, shall be distributed to the surviving spouse, children
or next of kin or other persons, in the manner following: 0 7
"1. One-third part to the surviving spouse, and the residue
in equal portions to the children, and such persons as legally
represent the children if any of them have died before the deceased.
["One-third part" as used above, included both real and personal property.
The phrase "residue in equal portions to the children" means
that the heirs shall take as tenants in common. The New York
Statute in this respect thus followed the rule of partible distribution as laid down in the Statute of Distributions as opposed to the
doctrine of primogeniture as laid down in Blackstone's Canons
of Descent.
And the expression "and such persons as legally represent the
children if any of them have died before the deceased," means
that in this situation the New York Statute followed the doctrine
of representation as stated in Blackstone's Canons of Descent.]
The first paragraph was therefore taken partly from Blackstone's Canons of Descent and partly from the Statute of Distributions.
2. If the deceased leaves a surviving spouse and both parents
surviving, and no child or descendant, the surviving spouse shall
take five thousand dollars and one-half of the residue, and the
parents shall each take one-half of the balance; ff there be no
surviving spouse, the parents shall each take one-half of the whole.
[The phrase, "the parents shall each take" a certain share, introduces descent in the ascending scale so as to include parents
and grand-parents, which policy was adopted from the Statute
of Distributions, as opposed to the Canons of Descent which provided that "inheritances shall lineally descend, . . . but shall

never lineally ascend." The rule as stated by Blackstone was an
' The material enclosed in brackets consists of comments on each paragraph
of section 83, showing whether the provisions of each section were taken from
Blackstone's Canons of Descent or the Statute of Distributions.

ORDINANCE OF WM

fIAA1CONQUEROR

outgrowth of the feudal system, under which one man could not
be the lord and heir of the same piece of land, while the rule as
stated in the statute constituted a reversion to the rule which
prevailed in England in Saxon times.]j 0
3. If the deceased leaves one parent surviving, and no child
or descendant, and a surviving spouse, the surviving spouse shall
take five thousand dollars and one-half of the residue, and the
surviving parent shall take the balance; if there be no surviving
spouse, the surviving parent shall take the whole.
[This paragraph is merely an extension or expansion of descent
in the lineal ascending scale.]
4. If the deceased leaves a surviving spouse, and no descendant, parent, brother or sister, nephew or niece, the surviving
spouse shall be entitled to the whole thereof; but if there be a
brother or sister, nephew or niece, and no descendant or parent,
the surviving spouse shall take ten thousand dollars and one-half
of the residue, and the balance shall descend and be distributed
to the brothers and sisters and their representatives.
[The phrase "and the balance shall descend and be distributed
to the brothers and sisters and their representatives" follows
Blackstone's Canons of Descent in permitting collaterals to inherit, without the common law limitations that such inheritance
must be limited to those collateral relations who were of the blood
of the fi-st purchaser. The phrase "and their representatives" was
taken from the Statute of Distributions, under which it was interpreted as prohibiting representation of collaterals further than
by children of the intestate's brothers and sisters.] 169
5. If there be no surviving spouse, the whole thereof shall
descend and be distributed equally to and among the children,
and such as legally represent them.
[The statement, that "the whole thereof shall descend and be
distributed equally to and among the children," makes the children tenants in common, in accordance with the Statute of Distributions, as pointed out in paragraph one. And the phrase
LAw

"REPPY
AND
OF WuiLs,

"

Tom'KrNs,

HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY BACKGROUND OF T-E

c. II, 69 (Chicago, 1928).
Carter v. Crawley, 1 Freeman 297, 89 Eng. Rep. 215, 216 (1680); Id., Sir

T. Raym. 496, 83 Eng. Rep. 259 (1681).
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"and such as legally represent them," again, as in paragraph one,
introduces the doctrine of representation taken from Blackstone's
Canons of Descent, under which the taking is called succession
in stirpes, or according to the root, since all branches inherit the
same share that their root, whom they represent, would have
done. Of course, where the heirs stand in the same degree, they
take per capita, and not per stirpes.]
6. If there be no surviving spouse, and no children, and no
representatives of a child, and no parent, the whole shall descend
and be distributed to the next of kin, in equal degree to the
deceased; and if all the brothers and sisters of the intestate be
living, the whole shall descend and be distributed to them; if
any of them be living and any be dead, per stirpes,to the brothers
and sisters living, and the descendants in whatever degree of
those dead.
[Under paragraph 6, under the prescribed conditions the collateral descendants are permitted to inherit the entire estate as
tenants in common if they stand in equal degree of consanguinity.
This provision follows the Canons of Descent, but without the
limitation that the collateral kinsman must be of the whole blood
and without any preference of male over female. The elimination of these exclusive devices from the New York Statute reflects
the spirit of liberality which distinguished the Statute of Distributions. This paragraph also adopted the common-law doctrine of representation among collaterals, under which the children of deceased brothers and sisters took per stirpes.]
7. If the deceased was illegitimate and leave a mother, and
no child, or descendant, and no surviving spouse, such mother
shall take the whole and shall be entitled to letters of administration in exclusion of all other persons. If the deceased shall leave
a surviving spouse, the surviving spouse shall take five thousand
dollars and one-half of the residue, and the mother shall take the
balance. If the mother of such deceased be dead, the relatives
of the deceased on the part of the mother shall take in the same
manner as if the deceased had been legitimate, and be entitled
to letters of administration in the same order.
[At common law an illegitimate child had no inheritable
blood, hence could not be regarded as the heir of either his father
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or mother, and his own heirs were limited to his body. Following
the spirit of the canon law which permitted legitimation upon
subsequent marriage after a child was born out of wedlock, this
provision of the New York Statute permits a mother to inherit
from an illegitimate child, and if the mother of a deceased illegitimate child be dead, the deceased's relatives on the part of
the mother are entitled to take collaterally. This course of procedure was completely prohibited under Blackstone's Canons of
Descent.]
8. Where the distributees of the deceased, entitled to share
in his estate, are all in equal degree to the deceased, their shares
shall be equal.
[This paragraph again merely applies the rule of partible distribution in a given factual situation, and of course follows the
Statute of Distributions.]
9. When such distributees are of unequal degrees of kindred,
the whole shall descend and shall be distributed to those entitled
thereto, according to their respective stocks; so that those who
take in their own right shall receive equal shares, and those who
take by representation shall receive the share to which the parent whom they represent, if living, would have been entitled.
[The doctrine of representation as set forth in this paragraph
of the Statute follows Blackstone's Canons of Descent, making the
rule applicable to both real and personal property in mass, those
standing in equal degrees taking per capita; those standing in unequal degrees according to their respective roots or per stirpes.]
10. No representation shall be admitted among collaterals
after brothers' and sisters' descendants.
[This paragraph limiting representation among collaterals was
taken directly from the Statute of Distributions.]
11. Relatives of the half-blood shall take equally with those
of the whole blood in the same degree; and the representatives
of such relatives shall take in the same manner as the representatives of the whole blood.
[Under this provision of the New York Statute of Devolufion,
the next of kin, following the lead of the Statute of Distributions,
were determined by the civil law,17 0 under which the half-blood
1"2 KENT's Cohnm-tauuws, 423 (13th Am. ed. 1884).
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were admitted on an equal basis with the whole blood. And the
doctrine of representation, which found its way into both the
Canons of Descent and the Statute of Distributions, was made
applicable in the same manner as in the case of the whole
171
blood.]
12. Descendants and other distributees of the deceased, begotten before his death, but born thereafter, shall take in the
same manner as if they had been born in the lifetime of the
deceased, and had survived him.
[This provision of the Statute, permits posthumous children
to take equally with the other children, whether of the whole or
half-blood. This was decided in Burnett v. Mann,172 which construed the English Statute of Distributions, from which ours is
derived.]
13. If a woman die, leaving illegitimate children, or the legitimate descendants of deceased illegitimate children and no lawful issue, such children or descendants inherit her real and personal property as if such children were legitimate.
[This paragraph permits an illegitimate child to inherit from
its mother, which was within the spirit of the canon law and its
statutory product-the Statute of Distributions. Such a result
would have been wholly inimical to the Statute of Merton 173 and

Blackstone's Canons of Descent.]1 74
14. If there be no husband or wife surviving and no children,
and no representatives of a child, and no other distributees as
hereinbefore provided, then the whole estate shall descend and
be distributed to a surviving child of the husband or wife of the
deceased, or if there be more than one, it shall descend and be
175
distributed to them equally.
[This paragraph permits inheritance in a situation not covered
by Blackstone's Canons or the Statute of Distributions, but it is
within the spirit of the Statute.]
15. If there be no husband or wife surviving and no children,
'-Watts v. Crooke, 2 Vern. 124, 23 Eng. Rep. 689 (1690).
1 I Ves. 156, 27 Eng. Rep. 953 (1748).

" 20 Hen. III, c. 9 (1235).
R1EPPY AND Toam'x~ns, HISTORICAL AND STAT
LAW oF WILLS, c. II, 78 (Chicago, 1928).
' Repealed by N.Y. Laws 1938, c. 259, sec. 1.

TORY BACKGROUND OF THE

ORDINANCE OF WMLIAM THE CONQUEROR

and no representatives of a child, and no other distributees, and
no child or children of the husband or wife of the deceased, then
the whole shall descend and be distributed equally to the next
of kin of the husband or wife of the deceased, as the case may be,
and such next of kin shall be deemed next of kin of the deceased
for all the purposes specified in this article or in article seven
hereof; but such estate shall not, and shall not be construed to,
embrace any real or personal property except such as was received by the deceased from such husband or wife, as the case
may be, by will or by virtue of the laws relating to the descent
and distribution of the estate of the deceased person.17 6

[This paragraph recognized the existence of the ancestral
estate in New York and of course was of common law origin and
included in Blackstone's Canons of Descent.]
16. The right of an adopted child to take a share of the estate
and the right of succession to the estate of an adopted child shall
continue as provided in section one hundred and fourteen of the
77
Domestic Relations Law."
[The right of an adopted child to inherit is completely a product of modern statutory enactment. Not being of the blood of
the ancestor such a child could not inherit under the common law
rules of descent, nor could he take by distribution.]
This rough survey of the various elements represented in the
New York Statute of Devolution indicates that two-fifths of its
provisions were taken directly from Blackstone's Canons of Descent and approximately three-fifths of its provisions from the
Statute of Distributions. Or, to state the matter in another way,
in principle and in spirit, the New York Statute and other modern
statutes of devolution are composed of the better elements drawn
from both the Canons of Descent and the Statute, with the pre17
ponderant influence in favor of the Statute of Distributions,'

whose ancestry is said to reach as far back as the 118th Novel
of Justinian's Institutes (A.D. 543).'
Repealed by N.Y. Laws 1920, c. 174, see. 10.
a Renumbered as No. 14, and amended by Laws 1938, c. 259, sec. 2..
"22 & 23 Car. II, c. 10 (1670).
"' Cunm, MNWuAL oF CEIrL LAw, INsTrrFTEs OF JusTmiAN, [B. 3, T. 9] 217
(2d ed., London, 1865).
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X. CONCLUSION
Eight hundred and eighty-two years have elapsed since
William the Conqueror in 1072 ordered the separation of the
common law and ecclesiastical courts, thus setting in operation
forces which have produced astounding changes in Anglo-Saxon
law. The effect of that Act has neither run its full course, nor as
yet have its full implications been understood or traced. It is,
however, clear that many of the artificial distinctions between
real and personal property originated with the famous Ordinance,
which caused the substantive and procedural law of wills of real
estate and testaments of personal property to flow down separate
and distinct channels until reunited on the substantive law side
of the Wills Act of 1837180 and until reunited on the procedural
law side by the Court of Probate Act of 1857.181 It is also clear
that the distinctions between descent of freehold estates and the
distribution of personalty was accentuated by the separation, not
to be reunited on the side of devolution of the property of the
decedent as a mass until the enactment of the Law of Property
Act of 1922182 and the Administration of Estates Act of 1925.83
In America generally and in New York in particular, wills of
real estate had to meet the formalities in execution prescribed
by the English Statute of Frauds, which had been followed in the
colony, whereas testaments of personalty were not required to
meet any specific formality in execution. In other words the
situation as to wills and testaments in New York was the same as
in England prior to 1837. This remained true until the Revised
Statute of 1830184 was enacted, under which the same formalities
in execution were required for both wills and testaments, thus
bringing about their reunion on the substantive law side some
seven years prior to the time when the same development occurred in England.
But on the procedural side we had in New York the same
incongruous situation which prevailed for almost a thousand
years in England, to wit, that a decree admitting to probate a will
which disposed of both real and personal property was conclusive
's

7 Wm. IV & 1 Vict. c. 26.
20 & 21 Vict. c. 77.
12 & 13 Ceo. V. c. 16.
15 Geo. V. c. 23.
Rev. Stat. of N.Y., Pt. II, c. 6, tit. I, Art. III, sec. 40 (1829).
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evidence as to title to the personalty bequeathed thereunder, but
at most only prima facie evidence as to title to realty.
The established method of probating a will of real estate in
New York as in England, was by an action of ejectment, brought
by the devisee if he found the heir in possession, or by the heir
if he found the devisee in possession. Occasionally the title of the
devisee under a will also became involved in equity where partition was sought without the devisee's title having been confirmed by some form of probate. In this connection, Jessup has
said that if a testator made a will disposing only of realty and
then appointed an executor, a decree of probate was only conelusive evidence as to title to personalty.'8 5 This entire situation
was clarified by the Statute of 1910,18s under which the decree of

the Surrogate Court became conclusive evidence as to title to
both real and personal property, thus reuniting in New York the
law of wills and testaments on the probate side, making it no
longer necessary for a devisee to try his title in ejectment. This
occurred fifty-three years after the same development took place
in England, although the condition which led to this development
in England-the practice of the lay and spiritual judges sitting
together as one court prior to William's order of separation-never
had any existence in New York or in any other American colony.
Finally, the accentuation of the distinctions between personal
and real property which resulted from the separation of the common law and spiritual courts, and which had a decided bearing
on the development of the law of descent by the common law
courts and the law of distribution by the spiritual courts, aided
by Parliament's enactment of the Statute of Distributions, s was
reflected in the colonial law prior to the Revolution, and after the
Revolution by reason of the adoption of the common law so far as
its rules were applicable to frontier conditions. These distinctions,
which found expression on the descent side in Kent's Canons of
Descent and in the statutes regulating distribution of personalty,
subject to modification from time to time, remained in effect until
I1 JESsUP, TnE LAw Am Pn ccIE IN THE SURnoGATEs' COURTS IN T-E
See also, In Matter
of McMfllan, 133 Misc. 570, 233 N.Y. Supp. 4f5 (1929).
STATE OF NEW Yonx, see. 513, p. 1003 (New York, 1930).

" 2 Laws of N.Y. 1910, c. 578 (sec. 2625 of Code of Civil Procedure) p.
1416.
22 & 23 Car. III, c. 10 (1670).
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the new Statute of Devolution of 1929,188 under which the distinctions between real and personal property were abolished, thus
reuniting the law of descent and distribution in favor of a single
law regulating the devolution of an intestate decedent's property
in New York.
By reason of the foregoing, it thus becomes clear that the

substantive and procedural law of wills and testaments in New
York and in the twelve other original colonies, and as a consequence, in the United States at large, as in England, was thrown
into great confusion and was forced to develop along arbitrary
lines as a result of the act of William the Conqueror in separating

the common law and ecclesiastical courts in 1072; that the law of
probate became the subject of endless and needless litigation, and

the law of descent and distribution became so artificial and complicated as to become the despair of students, lawyers and judges.
All these consequences and many more have flowed out of the
blind adoption of a set of rules governing the law of succession in

England, although these rules, the reasons for which were founded
on grounds of feudal policy, never had any existence in America.
Yet we continued on blindly trying to find in them some logic

and to make them work. The whole story of this fantastic development is the finest example of the tenacity of the common

law, of how a common-law rule, once firmly established, goes on
down through the centuries, determining the destinies of those
members of society who fall within its sweep, until the original
1 89
reason for its creation becomes lost in the mists of antiquity.
" N.Y. Laws 1929, amending N.Y. Laws 1909, Real Property Law, Art. III.
Section 83 of the New York Statute of Devolution, 13 McKinney Consol.
Laws of N.Y., Art. III, p. 409, is not only important as showing a conjunction of
the better elements of Blackstone's Canons of Descent and the Statute of Distributions, but it also is clearly related to certain sections of the New York Decedent
Estate Law, such as sec. 17 (Charitable Bequests); sec. 18 (Right of Election);
sec. 26 (After-Borns); see. 29 (Legacies to Decedents or brothers and sisters
of the testator who predeceased testator).
There are also several sections of the Surrogates' Court Act which are indirectly related to Section 83, specifically, sees. 118-123; sees. 146, 147 (Surrogates' Court Act, Probate of Wills); sees. 49-51 with reference to designation of
persons interested in the estate.
It should also be observed that in spite of the fact that most people are
advised to execute wills, approximately 80% of the persons dying, die intestate,
so that the law of descent and distribution as set forth in Section 83 of the New
York Statute of Devolution, applies to more people than does the law of testate
succession,
'

